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MARKETS,
THE PATRIMONIAL
STATE,
AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION
Gail Bossenga

f the grand narratives of the French Revolution, only one,
the Marxist, explicitly offered an interpretation of the
relationship of markets to the origins of 1789. The story is a
familiar one: markets were important because they gave rise to a new
class, the commercial bourgeoisie. This class soon became locked in
class conflict with the nobility, whose economic roots rested in landed
wealth. Although the bourgeoisie accumulated vast wealth from the
spread of commercial capitalism, it remained excluded from formal
political power. It was only a matter of time until, in 1789, the rising
bourgeoisie overthrew the nobility and made its political power
commensurate with its economic resources. By implementing a
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program of economic liberalism, the bourgeois revolution also
guaranteed the growth of free markets for future generations.'
On a common sense level, this interpretation, simultaneously
simple and grand in scope, was appealing, but it proved to be unsatis
factory on many counts. One problem identified early on by the
economic historian George Taylor was that the legal categories of
"noble" and "third estate" did not constitute two socio-economic
classes, "feudal" and "bourgeois," if "classes" were defined by
ownership of property and relation to the market. The vast majority of
nobles and bourgeois invested their wealth in similar kinds of
markets—^in land, urban property, venal offices and rentes (annu
ities)^—^which remained far removed from the volatile world of
commercial capitalism. A small but significant portion of the nobility,
furthermore, chose to invest in capitalistic enterprises, including
government-chartered trading companies, estate-based manufactures
of glass and textiles, and mining enterprises.^ A second probleim was
that of social mobility. Close studies of ennoblement during the
eighteenth century revealed that thousands of commoners acquired the
legal status of noble dxiring the century before the Revolution, usually
by the purchase of an ennobling office.''

' See Georges Lefebvre, The Coming ojthe 'Blench Revolution, R. R. Palmer, trans. (Princeton:
University of Princeton Press,1947), and AlbertSoboul, TheVrench Revolution, 1787-1799:fronr
the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon, Alan Forrest and Colin Jones, trans. (New York; Random
House, 1974).
^ Rentes had been devised to allow lenders to circumvent Catholic usury laws. In the case of
rentes perpetuelles, perpetual annuities, a lender turned over his principal to a borrower in
exchange for fixed, annual interest payments. The principal was never amortixed; payments
continued until the principal was reimbursed to the lender. In the case of rentes tnagires, life
annuities, a borrower agreed to pay an annual sum on the lender's principal until the individual
or individuals specified in the contract died. Rentes could be issued by individuals or
institutions like the royal government See Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and JeanLaurent Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The PoliHcalEconomj ofCredit inParis, 1660-1870 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 16-17.
'"Non-capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French RsvoXwion" AmericanHistoricalRevien)
72 (1967): 469-96.
* On social mobilityand ennoblement,see David Bien,"La reaction aristocratique avant 1789:
I'exemple de Vaxmee," Annates, BS.C., 29 Qanvier-fevrier 1974): 23-48, (mars-avril 1974);
505-^34; "Manufacturing Nobles: The Chancelleries in France to 1789," Journal of Modern
History 61 (1989): 445—86; and "The Secretaires du Ron Corps and Privileges under the Ancien
Regime," in Ernst Hinrichs, Eberhard Schmitt, and Rudolf Vierhaus, eds., l^om Ancien R^ime
S(urVransfssichen Revolution:Forschungen undPerspektiven,(Gdttingen: Vandenhoeck undRuprecht,
1978), 153-168.
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If commoners were entering the ranks of the nobility in large
numbers, and if nobles and commoners invested in similar kinds of
property, then the idea that class conflict between the feudal nobility
and the capitalist bourgeoisie led to the Revolution no longer made
sense. Some revisionist historians contended that these trends revealed
an incipient process of fusion of wealthy nobles and bourgeois into a
plutocratic class of "notables" before the Revolution.^ Following this
line of thinking, Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret argued that nobles could
no longer be seen as economically backward, but played an important
role in promoting the development of capitalist markets: "the nobility
gave proof of ability to throw itself into innovation, to join the ranks
of modern capitalism, to throw off the weight of tradition, and to play
a part of breaking out of 'feudal' forms of production."® Other
historians, by contrast, rejected the idea of noble and bourgeois fusion
and pointed instead to examples of intranoble fission. Nobles were
fragmented by differences of wealth, birth, dynastic pretensions,
provincial affiliation, profession, religion, court connections, and
political outlooks. Certain parlements, for example, restricted member
ship in their corps to those with three or more generations of nobility,
while the Segur law of 1781 excluded new nobles from entrance into
the army officer corps by demanding that applicants demonstrate four
quarterings of nobility.' It now appeared as if as much conflict existed
inside the nobility itself as between nobles and commoners. The
diversity of empirical cases, along with the theoretical assaults upon
Marxism, left historians without any overarching thesis about the
origins of the Revolution. As Peter Jones declared:
If neither a fusionist nor a conflictual schematisation does
justice to the sheer complexity of ancien-re^me social structure,
we are left with a conceptual void. The best way to fiU it is
to abandon any notion of smooth-edged elites locked in onedimensional confrontation. By the reign of Louis XVI the

' William Doyle, Orifftis of the French Femlation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 24.
' The French NobiSty in the Fifteenth Century: From FeudaBm to Enlightenment, William Doyle,
trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 113.
'Jean Egret, "L'aristocratie parlementaire ftan^aise a la fin deI'ancien regime,"Revue Historique
(1952): 1-14; David Bien, "Reaction aristocratique," and his "The Army in the French
Enlightertment Reform, Reaction and Revolution," Past and Present 8S (1979): 68-98.
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ordering of society was in disarray: honour was no longer a
foolproof guide to rank, nor yet was wealth. Confusion
resulted and it took the outward form of a series of parallel
hierarchies often overlapping at the base and with no clear
sense of preeminence at the top.®

In this essay, I would like to revisit the problem of the "conceptual
void" in debates over the socio-political origins of the French Revolu
tion, as well as the empirical problem of the ordering of society and
"parallel hierarchies" within it. To do so requires putting on concep
tual lenses different from those framing the Marxist-revisionist debate
so that other elements can be brought into focus. These elements
include first, the independent role of institutions; second, the impor
tance of status, as opposed to class, as an essential type of social power;
third, the embeddedness of markets in the social and cultural frame
work of society rather than their role as progressive agents outside that
framework; and, fourth, the importance of the so-called "patrimonial"
state in bringing all of these elements into a coherent framework
whereby the origins of the Revolution can be assessed.

^ The Importance of Institutions ^
Historians study institutions all the time, but they give virtually no
theoretical attention to them as constitutive elements of social and
cultural change, including the origins of the French Revolution. This
is unfortunate,because institutional analysis, richly conceived, can offer
a way to join together insights from the "new" cultural history with
questions generated by older social approaches. Cultural history has
deepened our understanding of the underlying rules operating in a
society and how choices made by groups are culturally conditioned.'
Nonetheless, cultural frameworks have not explained very well how a
' Reform and Revolution in France: the Politics of Transition, 1774—1791 (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 71—72.
' Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Lynn Hunt, ed.. The New
Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
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polity actually gets done, or fails to get done, various essential tasks
such as feeding its population or defending itself in times of war. To
explain the latter tasks, it is necessary not only to explore the norms
and habits implicitly shaping social practice, but also what resources are
available, how they are deployed, and whatgroups have access to them.
Several dimensions of institutional analysis inform this essay.
First, as so-called "cognitive" theorists of institutions have stressed,
institutions have a strong cultural dimension. Through their rules,
symbols, and cultural frameworks, institutions help people to give
meaning to events around them and provide routinized ways to
apprehend social problems. Because institutional patterns code what
is deemed socially acceptable and unacceptable, institutions are not
inert or passive entities outside the process of historical change. By
defining what paths that are considered appropriate to follow,
institutions influence the direction of historical change.^" Second,
institutional analysis rests upon an awareness that possibilities for
societal change are "path dependent." By making certain decisions
now, individii^s may close off others for the future. Thus, depending
upon the timing of an event, institutional actors may have more or less
freedom to act, a greater or fewer number of options available for
consideration. History, in other words, matters." Third, a distinction
can be made between the wider system of habitual, tacit knowledge that
informs institutional patterns and specific"organizations," such as law
courts, schools, churches, and companies, that have explicit rules and
sanctions. An awareness of the organizational aspects of institutions

For example, Maty Douglas, Hojv Institutions Think (Syracuse.; Syracuse University Press,
1986); SvenSteiiuno, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth,eds., StructuringPoMcs. Historical
Institutionaiism inComparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Good
overviews of approaches include "Introduction" in Paul Dimaggio and Walter W Powell,
eds.. The Nen> Institutionaiism in Organis^onalAnalysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991) and Richard W Scott, Institutionsand Orgflmeyations (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995). I have
found William Sewell, Jr.'s insights particularly helpful in "A Theory of Structure: Duality,
Agency and Transformation," ydrvimaa Joumcdof Sociology (July 1992): 1-29.
" For example, Paul Pierson, 'Tncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
American Political Science RevieB'94 (2000): 251-67. Willkm Sewell,Jr., examines how
events serve as catalysts for historical change in 'TDstorical Events as Transformadons of
Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," Theory and Society 25 (1996): 841-81, and
"Three Temporalities: Toward anEventful Sociology" in Terrence McDonald, ed.. The Historic
Turn in the Human Sciences, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 245-80.
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is important for the study of power. Power rests in the ability to
classify what kinds of activities in society are desirable and undesirable,
but it also depends on access to resources. Organized institutions serve
as gatekeepers to resources. By defining who can or cannot become a
member of an organization, institutions facilitate an unequal distribu
tion of resources among various social groups. It is no coincidence
that those excluded from institutions are often marginal groups in
society: women, racial or religious outsiders, foreigners, and the
"lowly." In fact, exclusion from institutional participation may be
considered a definition of marginality. Furthermore, although
institutions may work to enhance the power of a particular class,
membership in institutions may also cut across class lines, and
individuals may belong to multiple institutions. The patterns formed
by institutions, therefore, may give rise to an array of conflicting
loyalties and to divisions and quarrels within elites.
The word "resource" immediately conjures up a picture of
material goods such as fees, manufactured products, money, or land.
Institutional resources certainly encompass these, but also include
intangible things such as sociability, accumulated experience, and
prestige, which are just as important as material resources for accom
plishing goals and reproducing social patterns.'^ The study of formal
laws, for example, can illuminate the broader cultural rules by which a
society is organized, yet laws canalso serve as resources by empowering
groups to accomplish tasks or employing sanctions to enforce
compliance.
One criticism of institutional history is that it has Htde room for
considerations of human agency, that is, the intentional ability of
individuals to influence their environment. AH the rules, regulations,
procedures and habits of institutions, it would appear, leave little scope
for individual initiative. It is possible, however, to turn this criticism on
its head. Agency is actually strongly correlated with access to institu
tions and position within them: it is "collective as well as individual.""
The father as head of the patriarchal household, the military com
mander ordering his soldiers into battle, or the presideiit of a business
corporation all derive their power by mobilizing the collective resources

" Sewell, "Theory of Structure," 9-13.
" Sewell, "Theory of Structure,"21.
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of their family, army, or business. In the old regime kings clearly had
far more opportunity to promote social change than did a mere
peasant, even if they could not reorganize their realms by fiat. In sum,
the role of institutions as sites of power that mediate access to
resources and define social identities make them fruitful arena for
attempting to insert social history back into the study of the politicalcultural origins of the French Revolution.

* Why Status? ^
So much attention has been paid to whether "class" was, or was not,
an organizing principle in the early modern period, that the distinctive
logic of status has been much neglected. Roland Mousnier was one
historian who depicted status as a defining feature of a society of
"orders" as opposed to a society of "classes." His analysis, however,
suffered from a teleology by which status, something characterizing the
early modern period, turned into class, a set of relations structuring
modern societies. Thus Mousnier spent a great deal of time defining
honor and status in the sixteenth and seventeenth centunes, but ended
up looking for the basis of class conflict once he reached the eigh
teenth. Paradoxically, this critic of Marxist analysis ended up perpetuat
ing an analysis of the origins of the Revolution quite similar to his
erstwhile opponents." Because of this implicit transformation of status
into class, Mousnier seriously underestimated status as a kind of
ongoing power in its own right and was unable to ask how the
Revolution changed its nature. But the French Revolution was a
profound revolution in status. It did not usher in the reign of a new
kind of class society, but instead gave rise to the regime of the "citizen"
by repudiating the special privileges attached to status groups in the old
regime. The democratic citizenship of the Revolution created legal

"In the last quarter of the 18th century a whole movement of ideas manifested itself which
was aimed at sweeping away the ancient constitution of French society in orders and estates
and replacing it by a class society." Roland Mousnier, Tie InstitutionsofPrance Underthe Absolute
Monarchy, 1598—1789, voL I, Society and the State, trans. Brian Pearce (Chicago; University of
Chicago Press, 1979), 36.
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equality among members of the state and entided new groups to make
rlaitns on the State's resources according to different rules."
A status-based society may be defined as one in which a person's
place in a system of graded social positions is based upon shared
perceptions of honor and esteem. In the old regime, it was taken for
granted as the part of the "natural" order that men and women were
entitled to a place in the social hierarchy according to their degree of
honor, from nobles at the top down to "base" individuals at the
bottom. Honor was considered, in part, an intrinsic quality conferred
on a person through birth. One connotation of the word naissance,
according to the dictionary of the Academic Fran9aise in 1694, was
"the good or bad qualities with which one is born."" Yet honor also
had strong performative aspects: it demanded that individuals follow
a code of conduct appropriate to their social station and that "inferi
ors" publicly defer to "superiors." Degrees of honor were continually
made visible in everyday forms of address such as Monseigneur, in the
rankings of groups in public ceremonies, and in rituals of deference
whereby those of lesser status removed their hats in the presence of
their superiors.
Many historians have viewed status as a mere normative scheme
with little effect on the "real" world governed by economic interests."
This is only true is one does not believe that cultural norms and laws
have an effect on how individuals make decisions and how resources
are distributed. Here the insights of Max Weber are useful to recall.
Weber argued that status was an actual form of power, one analytically
During the Revolution, the equation of the "citizen" with members of themale propertied
elite seemed to make citizenship an aspect of class relations, but the principles legitimating
citizenship could also be used to critique class. Eventually excluded groups, such as women
and the unpropertied, made successful claims to this status. On women see Joan Wallach
Scott, Onfy Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the PJghts of Man (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1996). For suggestions on the relationship between estates and citizenship
see my "Status, Corps, and Monarchy: Roots of Modem Citizenship in the Old Regime," in
Robert M. Schwartz and Robert A. Schneider, eds., TocqueriUe and Beyond: Essays on the Old
B^mein Honor of David D. Bien (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003), 127-54.
" Cited by Jay Smith in The Culture ofMerit: Nobility, Boyal Service, and the Making of Absolute
Monardff in Hance, 1600-1789 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 62.
" For example,"it need hardly be repeated that this assortment ofgroups [estates and orders]
is the expression of a traditional vision rather than of underlying realities...they [literate
persons in the old regime] were incapableof looking social reality in the face."Pierre Goubert,
TheAncien VJ§me: French Society, 1600-1789, trans. Steve Cox (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), 216.
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distinct from class.'® Class was defined as a system of groups that
enjoyed common economic power derived from ownership of property
and position in the market. Control of scarce economic resources
allowed one class to dominate another. The power of status, by
contrast, rested in its ability to shape the life opportunities of individu
als through the social replication of patterns of honor and esteem. In
the old regime, choice of a marriage partner, access to education,
entrance into ruling institutions, and so forth were strongly conditioned
by considerations of the rank and reputation of a person. Ahsdair
Mclntyre captured this idea when he observed that in traditional
societies honor is what is owed to individuals "by reason of their
having a due place in the social order."" This sense of "dueness," that
is, entidement or preemptive claims on resources by virtue of one's
distinguished position, gave those with superior status in society an
important advantage over others.
In the old regime, the power of status was given even stronger
effect through the role of law. Status was a formal, juridically-defined
quality whose entitlements and obligations were defined and enforced
by the absolute monarchy. Owing to the nobility's reputed intrinsic
superiority, for example, institutions continually directed all sorts of
advantages to this group as its due. In the period 1682—1700, for
example, only 8 per cent of the 136 archbishops and bishops were nonnobles, but from 1774—1790 this already small figure was reduced to a
mere 1 per cent. In the mid-eighteenth century, nobles monopolixed
between 80 and 85 per cent of all the posts in the army officer corps,
rising to about 90 percent on the eve of the Revolution. The case of
the sovereign judicial courts is more ambiguous, because commoners
could enter the courts and were ennobled over time by purchasing an
office of magistrate. Nonetheless, in the eighteenth century, the
sovereign courts were staffed overwhelmingly by men who already
possessed nobility (81%); the parlements in Rennes and Nancy
accepted only those with four generations. Finally, after 1732 it was

"Max Weber, EcononyandSodtty:An Out&m oflnterpredve Sociology,Claus Wittich and Guenther
Roth, eds., Ephraim Fischoff, et. al., trans., 2 vols. (Berkeley; University of California Press,
1978), 1: 24—38,302—7. A good discussion of Weber's distinctions between class and status
is found in Anthony Giddens, Cc^Ha&snt attdModentSocialTheory: An Analysis ofthe Writingfof
Marx, Dnrkheim andMax IPifer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1971), 119-247.
After Virtue (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 46.
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necessary to prove 300 years of nobility, or have the favor of the king,
in order to be presented at the coiirt of Versailles.^ As these examples
attest, possession of a distinguished lineage, was a resource that opened
doors to important institutions in the old regime and kept these doors
closed tighdy to others.
To say that status was important in determining the opportunities
of individuals for success in life does not mean that money was
unimportant. Nor does the growing appearance of a monetary
economy in the old regime mean that status relations were disappearing
and class relations replaced them, as Mousnier suggested. Historians
tend to think that status simply followed the penetration of wealth, but
it is dear that the rdationship was far more complex. Status helped to
define how wealth should be used, that is, what the appropriate goals
for investment were in the first place. The case of sodal mobility dted
earlier in the paper is instructive. Thousands of men invested substan
tial sums of money in venal offices so that they could become noble.
These ennobling offices, in particular offices of "secretary of the
king,"did not carry a high monetary return, nor were they accompanied
by important functions.^' Rather, it was the quest for status that
influenced these men. By continually coding certain actions as
honorable or dishonorable, then, status exerted a powerful influence on
collective dedsion-making and even on the flow of capital itself.
The growth of market forces in the old regime, however, was a
cause of concern for status relations on two counts. First, the
principles legitimating status in the old regime were diametrically
opposed to those of the market. Those things that the old regime
revered as honorable and that supposedly characterized the nobil
ity—distinguished lineage, generosity, a spirit of sdf-sacrifice, heroism
on the battlefidd, and disdain for mundane monetary matters—were
exactly those things that could not be purchased for money. The
traditional hierarchy of status in the old regime thus constantly
reinforced a cultural disdain for market forces. The dergy, intercessors
before God, the nobility, heroic warriors of purer blood, and the liberal
professions-doctors, lawyers, officials, rentiers, and professors—were
^ Mousnier, Institutions of France, 324,162-63,153; see Bien's "Reaction aristoctatique," for
statistics on social mobilityin the army and judicial courts, including a table with genealogical
patterns of the parlements (511).
Bien, "Secretaires du 'Rot.
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all groups that did not have to sully themselves ditecdy by having
contact with the grubbing for profit and deceptive, self-interested
practices associated with the market.^ Hence, even when they enjoyed
great wealth, merchants were still considered inferior in standing to the
former groups. They were too strongly associated with the love of
"vile gain."
Second, the market, in principle antithetical to the whole hier
archy of status, became, in fact, the most important legal means of
acquiring it. In order to fill its coffers for war, the royal government
created markets on which individuals could, in effect, purchase status.
Individuals who wanted to shed their lowly rank as commoners became
able to purchase ennobling offices from the monarchy. The marriage
between status and its erstwhile antagonist, the market, created a great
deal of tension and "status anxiety" that ended only when the Revolu
tion abolished the traditional foundations of status, as well as the
markets that had provided access to status mobility. Expressions of
superiority and inferiority, honor and dishonor, still persisted after the
R^olution, as a reading of the novels of Balzac easily demonstrates.
But thelegal, public qualities attached to various status groups—apolitic
al representation through distinctive chambers or "orders," profes
sional monopolies, tax exemptions, special access to different royal
courts for judicial trials, and the like—^were all destroyed. In the public
realm, the juridical status of citizenship now defined the distribution of
state-mediated resources.

^ Markets as Social Organizers ^
Markets are often treated as part of a distinct domain called the
"economy," but as institutional economists have observed, they are
better seen as one important source, among several, of the organization
of society as a whole. "A market system," as the economist Charles
Lindblom has observed, "is a pattern of cooperative human

^ As the jurist Charles Loyseau noted, "it is baseand sordid gain that derogates from nobility.
The proper course for nobility is to live from one's rents, or at least not to sell one's efforts
and one's labour." A Treatise of Orders and Pbdrt Dignities, Howell A. Lloyd, trans. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111.
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behaviot."^ For most of human history, markets served as an adjunct
to other methods of coordinating human behavior,such as custom, the
traditional obligations of hierarchical society, familial duties, and
coercive demands by political authorities (the "state"). In contrast to
such methods, which depend on sentiments like honor, duty or fear,
markets facilitated the transfer of goods through a voluntary system of
exchange based upon self-interest. Markets, however, still operate
within wider cultural patterns legitimating human conduct. What
things are appropriate to exchange in markets is a social decision that
goes beyond the mechanism of monetary transactions itself. In the
past, for example, it was common in the West to put human beings up
for sale on slave markets, something which these societies today
excoriate. The egalitarian and voluntaristic connotations of reciprocal
exchange were one reason that the growth of the market had unsettling
effects in a deferential, honor-bound society Uke the old regime.
Traditionally those of high status had a pre-emptive claim on resources
as their "due"; resources flowed to them by dint of custom, legislative
command or tribute to their great dignity. Thus, those of great rank
did not regard it as fitting that they would be bound by the reciprocity
implicit in market contracts. Many noble grandees in the old regime,
for example, considered paying their debts on time beneath them.^^
The market, in addition as we have noted, was viewed as the cradle
of dishonor. The traits that reputedly defined the nobles' distinctive
status—^pure blood, military valor, generosity of spirit, and illustrious
birth—^were beyond the ignoble and impersonal sphere of purchase.
What the market could offer, however, were the external marks of a

® The Market System: What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001), 39. On the seminal importance of Karl Polanyi's work for situating
markets within larger social structures see Dougjass North, "Markets and Other Allocation
Systems," Journal of European Economic Histoiy 6 (197T): 703-16. The work of the new
institutional economists on markets is helpful in its emphasis on the importance of property
rights and transaction costs, but it does not address the question of status. Margaret Levi, for
example, states that'T include only resources that have a material basis and could, in principle,
be quantified. I exclude legitimacy, status and authority...my major reason for this exclusion
is that they are, more often than not, a consequence of other resources." Of Rale and Revenue
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 17.
"The king's "grace," for example, made provision for sursiancesthat preventeda creditor from
pursuing a debtor in court for a specified time. Nobles especially clamored for and abused
them. Rene-Marie Rampelberg, Le Ministre de la mcdson du rot, 1783-1788, Baron de Breteml
(Paris: Economica, 1975), 137-38.
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noble lifest7le: ostentatious dwellings, servants, silks, land, sumptuous
feasts, and even the service of creative genealogists. After "living
nobly" for a long enough period, a commoner in the sixteenth or
seventeenth century might be able to "usurp" nobility, that is, pass off
an aristocratic lifestyle as the natural product of birth.^
A variety of regulations were aimed to prevent just that and to
keep the forces of the market at bay. Sumptuary laws prohibited
commoners from appropriating the silks, velvets, and other forms of
noble dress. Non-nobles could buy fiefs, but their common status
remained visible by the obligation to pay the royal fee known as the
franc-fief. Except in important port regions, nobles could not practice
the occupation of wholesale merchant without fear of derogation, that
is, loss of noble status, including customary tax privileges. In some
regions, inheritance laws prevented the alienation of a noble family's
patrimony so that it would be passed down intact to heirs or remain
under family control.^
In the early stages of their development, it is doubtful that markets
posed a grave danger to noble identity. There were not enough
commodities widely available for purchase, and nobles themselves were
not oriented to seizing opportunities on markets that might exist
Great nobles regarded land primarily as something to rule, rather than
as a commodity to buy and sell. Land provided a dignified avenue by
which to extract customary labor and fees from dependent peasants
and to seal the fidelity of dients by parceling out chunks of territory to
lesser nobles. In the sixteenth century, for example, the manor of the
important seigneurs of Pont-St-Pierre \jras stillsubsistence oriented and
had a kitchen that was locally stocked. At the beginning of the
seventeenth century, the wife of the great comte de Saulx was purchas
ing her clothes in local Burgundian villages, and, remarkably, even

For examples see George Huppert, Les Bourgeois Gentilshommes: An Esso)/ on the D^nition of
Elites in Btnmssance France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 7-13.
Gaston Zeller, "Une notion de caractae historico-social: la d&ogeance," Cahiersinternationaux de sociology 22 (1957): 40-77. For examples of sumptuary laws, see Renato GaUiani,
Rousseau, le luxe et I'ideohg^ nobiHaire; (tude sodo-Ustorique, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 268 (Oxford, 1989), 98-117. For a table of noble inheritance rights, see Samuel Clark,
State and Status: The Base of the State and Aristocratic Rower in Western Europe (Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press, 1995), 232.
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bought "thread to mend the coat of Monseigneur."^^ Thus, although
variations in wealth existed among nobles, these differences did not
give rise to a sustained competition for the acquisition of things, and
the market itself did not play a major role in differentiating nobles.
By the mid-eighteenth century, this milieu had changed enor
mously. Between 1700 and 1789, the French population increased from
approximately 19,000,000 to 26,000,000 inhabitants and an incipient
national market began to break down regional autarky. The substantial
expansion of overseas trade, the spread of rural industry, and the
emergence of the commercial revolution meant that a dizzyingarray of
consumer goods were offered on the market. Consumers began to
regard sugar, coffee, chocolate and tobacco as staples, rather than
luxuries. All sorts of items once considered marks of noble sta
tus—watches, fans, snuffboxes, mirrors, wigs, ornate clothing, 'and
umbrellas—^began tocome within the reach of even well-to-do artisans.
The customary idea that clothing should reveal the fixed status of a
person gave way to "fashion" with its implicit acceptance of social
mobility and belief that individuals should keep up with changes in
style. After 1750 an onslaught of fashion journals appeared to inform
the (female) public what was in vogue. Over the course of the
eighteenth century, the value of clothing of even poor Parisian women
increased sixfold.^ In this environment, the pressure upon nobles to
consume, and to consume on a scale of unprecedented lavishness in
order to maintain marks of their superiority, was enormous. In the
1788, 20,000 tivres, one-third of the Duke of Sardx-Tavannes' total

Jonathan Dewald, PontSt-Piem, 1398-1789: hardship, Community, and CapitaUsm in Earty
Modem France (Berkeley: Umversity of California Press, 1987), 193-98. On giving grants of
land in exchange for loyalty, 63. Robert Forster, The House of Saulx-Tavannes: VersaiUes and
Burgmity, 1700-1830 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 6-7.
^ Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, eds., Histoire iconomique et sociale de la France, 4 vols.
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 2:1,17,161-215; Colin Jones and Rebecca
Spang, "Sans-CuhtUs, Sans Cefl, Sans Tabac. Shifting Realms of Necessity and Luxury in
Eighteenth-Century France," in Maxine Berg and Helen Clifford, eds.. Consumers andIMXUIJ:
ConsumerCuUure inEurope 1650-1850(Manchester: Manchester University Press,1999), 37-82;
Cissie Fairchilds,"The Productionand Marketingof Populuxe Goods in E^hteenth-Century
Paris," in John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds.. Consumption and the World of Goods, 228-48;
Jennifer Jones, "Repackaging Rousseau: Femininity and Fashion in Old Regime France,"
French Historical Studies 18 (Fall, 1994): 939-67; Daniel Roche, The Culture of Clothing, Jean
Birrell, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5,13,108.
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annual expenditures, went to purchase clothing and accessories.^'
Nobles of any means left their estates to managers and moved to Paris
or provincial capitals to enjoy the good life of theater performances,
fine wines, gastronomic delicacies, perhaps even a private bathtub.
Moralists, most famously Rousseau, denounced the debilitating effects
of luxe and the soft, artificial, egotistical sentiment that it produced.
Just as threatening to the noble's monopoly on external signs of
distinction was the market's tendency to reduce all kinds of worth, even
social worth, to monetary terms. In the market, where money was the
primary medium of social exchange, one person's money was as good
as another's. Transactions no longer necessarily had to operated
according to the customary marks of deference. Toward the end of the
eighteenth century, for example, the philanthropist Piarron de
Chamousset proposed to create a hospital run as a mutual aid society
in which people would pay into six "classes." The more that individu
als contributed, the more privacy and better quarters they would receive
when they used the hospital. The proposal provoked outrage from one
critic who lamented that all the estates would be "thrown together and
confused" and that there would not "be any pther distinction than that
of money." Can you put a price on "good society," queried this
author? "Decency for 20 w/H Decency for 30
Decency for one
four francs, one hundred solA What an incredible notion!"^'
Equally illustrative was a dispute over theater seats. Wearing a
rose-colored coat, a sword, and plumed hat, the Comte de MoretonChabriUant, captain of the guard of the Comte de Provence, demanded
that Pernot-Duplessis, a proctor in the parlement, give up his seat to
him. Duplessis refused, stating "I have a right to be here for my
money." In reply, the count called on his guards to throw Duplessis
out by force. Duplessis immediately took his case to the parlement,
where his lawyer argued that it was "in the general interest of the Public
to defend the individual whose simple status as Citizen should have
warded off any kind of insult in a place where money alone put
commoners and nobles on the same footing."^' The parlement ordered
" Foister, House o/Sauic-Tammes, 126.
Claude Humbert Piarron de Chamousset, Hues d'un dtegen (Paris, 1757; reprint ed. Paris:
EDHIS, 1970), which includes theiMre critique <J rauUurd'tme "Brochure inrituUe: Plan d'uneMcason
d'AssociaHon, quotation at 125.
" Simon Schama, CiHs^m:A Chronicle of the French Ptvolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 138.
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the count to pay six thousand livres 'm damages. The traditional "due"
accorded to those of superior status, it appeared, was giving way to the
homogenizing dictates of cold cash.

^ Seigneurialism and Markets ^
While monetary transactions could erode marks of personal status, this
was not their only possible effect. Given theinstitutional arrangements
of the old regime, the rise of commerce often ended up producing not
greater freedom, but market monopolies, as the case of seigneurialism
illustrates. The original rationale for seigneurialism harked back to a
pre-statist period when the lord was responsible for protecting his
peasants, much as a head of household was supposed to protect his
dependents. In a seigneuty, land was not regarded as a commodity to be
bought and sold at wiU for a profit, but as a unit of legal jurisdiction
with corresponding rights of patronage and distinction. Seigneurial
dues, monetary payments owed by peasants to lords, institutionalized
the status relations between lord and peasant. A payment like the cens
was more than a monetary payment: it declared the noble's lordship
over the peasant. By the late eighteenth century, the growth of markets
made it possible to exploit seigneurial dues in new ways, and the
original justification for seigneurialism as a system of patronage and
protection could no longer be justified. Many seigneurs had become
absentee landlords, farmed out the collection of their dues to others,
and headed for the soft life in the city.
Discussion of seigneurial dues usually centers on how oppressive
they were to the peasantry. Far less is said, about how the combination
of seigneurialism and markets facilitated the rise of monopolies, which
usually ended up in the hands of nobles. In Picardy, for example,
where seigneurial dues were minimal, seigneurs relied on their priAdleges
to draw up lucrative leases that granted merchants logging rights in
forests at a time when wood prices were skyrocketing. In Toulouse
and Bordeaux, lords used their option rights {droit de retrait^) to force
individuals who had recendy acquired land to resell it to the lords. Not
only was it infuriating to see a lord corner the market in land, but the
lack of a statute of limitations on many seigneurial rights allowed a lord
to resurrect old dues from ages past, demand immediate payment, and
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seize land if the peasant could not comply. In Bordeaux, a lord could
even use his option rights retroactively to purchase land, so that land
purchased years earlier by an individual could be forced back onto the
market.^^ These examples suggest that in highly commercialized areas,
the value of seigneurial rights was most likely to be found not in the
direct exploitation of peasants, but in the creation of monopolistic
markets benefitting lords. The legal arrangements of seigneurialism,
developed far earlier in a non-market economy, distorted developing
markets by creating arbitrariness and undermining secure property
rights. The frustration generated by these unjust practices was
recorded in the cahiers de doUances of 1789 of the Third Estate. Accord
ing toJohn Markoff, there was more opposition to "various seigneurial
monopolies, the dues on fairs and markets, the compulsory labor
services, the seigneurial tolls, or the property transfer dues," than to
payments like the cens?^
A final characteristic of seigneuiialism should be stressed: its
conflation of public authority and private property. This inability to
differentiate between public and private spheres was, of course, a legacy
of the middle ages in which a distinct concept of the "state" as opposed
to "society" did not exist, and in which "ownership" was not clearly
distinguished from"rulership."^'^ The amalgamation of public authority
and personal patrimony in seigneuries had important effects on
markets. When seigneuries were sold, their "extra-economic" rights
came with them. Someone who purchased a seigneury received not
only the land, but the distinguished tide (baron or count, for example).

^ Florence Gauthier, "Formes d'evoludondu syst^e agraire communautaire enPicardie (fin
XVIIIe-debut XEXe siecle)," Annaks historiques de la rivolu&m franfoise 240 (1980): 188-89;
Robert Forster, "The Provincial Noble:A Reapptaisal,"y4«»7«i7« HiitoricalReviev (April 1963):
685; Gerard Aubin, "La Crise du prelevement seigneurial a la fin de I'Ancien Regime," in
Robert Chagny, ed., Aece Oriffnesprovinciales de k 'RholuHon (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires
de Grenoble, 1990): 23-33.
"John Markoff, The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legsslators in the French devolution
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), 73. Markoff observed that "The third
estate had an antiseigneurial agenda, particularly focused on barriers to the perfecting of the
market," 201. He also noted that there was far more readiness by bourgeois members of the
third estate than by peasants to indemnify lords if these privileges were dismantled. See the
table, 112.
" A good discussion of this problem is Herbert H. Rowen, The King's State: Proprietary
Dynasdcism in Far^ Modem Ranee (New Brunswick: Rubers University Press, 1980), chapter
1.
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seigneurial jurisdiction, and possibly political rights of representation
that went with it. In Languedoc, for example, nobles could only sit in
the provincial estates if they owned fiefs. Thus, the mechanism
mediating political representation for nobles was either inheritance or
the purchase of this l^d of property. As one historian noted, in such
a system, "public honors are part of one's patrimony; one inherits the
right to sit in the estates like a metairie"^^
This tendency to link political authority and status with personal
ownership ran through many institutions in the old regime. It meant
that it was acceptable to sell things, such as the right to sit in a
representative assembly, that today would be regarded as off-limits to
monetary transactions.'® When vast sectors of the state were character
ized by such activity, we have what Max Weber called a "patrimonial
state" and the possibility for forms of market activity that we no longer
recognize and that were, in fact, generally abolished by the French
Revolution.

•

Markets and the Patrimonial State ^

Although Weber is usually associated with the ideas of "rationalization"
and "bureaucracy," he argued that most premodern kingdoms and
empires were characterized not by bureaucracy in the modern sense but
by patrimonialism. In a patrimonial system, the so-called "state"
developed by taking on the form of the ruler's estate writ large, and the
metaphors justifying power stemmed from domestic relations in the
king's own household. The king ruled as father of his people, while the
royal household, the court, was simultaneously the seat of the king's
family life and center of official policymaking. Administrative networks
were highly personal, based in patron-client relations and in heritable

Paul Rives, Etuik sur ks attributionsfinanrihes des itats de hanff/edocau dix-huitieme stick (Paris:
E. Thorin,1885), 67.
^ For an interesting perspective on how rights became viewed as negotiable things during the
Middle Ages, seeJ. G. A. Pocock, "The Idea of Citizenship since Classical Times,"in Gershon
Shafir, ed.. The Citit^ensh^ Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1998), 31-41. According to Pocock (36), "it is in jurisprudence, long before the rise and
supremacy of the market, that we should locate the origins of possessive individualism."
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offices whose official functions were not clearly separate from a
family's patrimony. The concept of "merit" existed, but it was assumed
that blood and birth bestowed on certain groups a natural propensity
to perform meritorious tasks. Owing to the low level of technology
and lack of an efficient, paid bureaucracy, the state was also liable to
farm out tasks to other groups rather than to do them itself, a tendency
that fostered a dispersion of administrative tasks rather than centraliza
tion.^' Whereas the Marxist emphasis on class conflict left little room
for the state's independent role, and Tocqueville's thesis of centraliza
tion offered little perspective on the relationship between government
and economy, Weber linked patrimonial states directly to markets.
Patrimonial states, he suggested, were instrumental in developing
markets not to stimulate the rise of capitalism per se, but to finance
their own activities, especially war.'® Unsurprisingly, the markets that

See chapters 12 and 13 of Weber, Eaisoi^ and Sodel]i, 2:1006-1110. Weber observed that
patrimonklism "remained dominant in Continental Europe up to the French Revolution," but
also noted that bureaucracy often arose out of patrimonial forms of officialdom. 2:1087. For
the concept of patrimonklism applied in Europe see Thomas Ertman, Birti of the Loviathan:
BuiLUng States and R^mes in Medieval and Earif Modem Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), who argues that Latin Europe was characterized by "patrimonial
absolutism." On the army in early modem France see Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and
theAmyUnderLauisXIV:KiyaISennceandPrivateInterest, 1661—1701 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), part I 'Tatrimonial Bureaucracy." For patrimonial practices in the
bureaucracy, Clive Church, Revolution andRedTipe: ThePrenchMinisteria/Bureaucragi 1770-1850
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). On the court as both aristocratic household and seat of
government, see Jeroen Duidam, Vienna and VenmUes: The Courts of Europe's Dynasdc Rivals
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For the Netherlands, seeJulk Adams, "The
Familial State: Elite Family Practices and State-making in the Early Modem Netherlands,"
Theory andSodety23 (1994): 505—39. Carter Rndley uses Weberkn patrimonklism toelucidate
the Ottoman Empire in Bureaucratic Rjformin the OttomanEmpire: TheSubSme Porte, 1789—1922
(Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980). Far more scholars use the concept in the study
of developingcountries. See, for example, Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonklkm and Empire Building in the New States," World Politics, vol. 10 (1968): 194—203; JeanFrancois Medard,"The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelismor NeoPatrimonialism?" in Christopher Clapham, ed.. Private Patronage and Public Potver: Political
Clientelism in the Modem State (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), 162-92; and Eric N. Budd,
Democratisption, Development, and the Patrimonial State in the Age of Globatiyation (Lanham, Md.:
Lexington Books, 2004). On the misreading of Max Weber as an "Eurocentric author
preoccupied with analysis of origin of modern capitalism," see Schmuel N. Eisenstadt and
Wolfing Schluchter, "Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities—A Comparative View,"
Daedalus 127 (Summer, 1998), 6.
"As Weber remarked, "scholars have often overlooked one constant thathas beenhistorically
important in the development of strong, centralized patrimonial bureaucracies—trade."
Econorry and Sodetf, 2:1092.
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these states encouraged tnirrored the structure and aims of the state
itself. The state hedged in markets with tolls and tariffs that siphoned
off revenue for the government, and created state-sanctioned monopo
lies to the same end. These markets wedded commercial exchange to
political and fiscal functions, relied on patronage to get business done,
and existed in a climate of legal arbitrariness. The erratic legal
environment stemmed in large part from the position of the ruler who,
as sovereign, was considered above the law and hence able to engage
in activities, like changing terms of contracts, beyond the power of
ordinary individuals. The ruler's own self interest, however, also served
as a check to complete arbitrariness. He needed economic growth and
"the accumulation of wealth, so that he [could] draw on tax-farmers,
farmers of official supplies and on credit sources."^'
In early modern France, the ruler's fiscal needs, a semi-erratic legal
environment, and the blurring of public and private spheres all strongly
conditioned markets serving the state. Nobles, and particularly
financiers, were central participants in these markets by dint of their
economic resources and their connections at court. Financiers made
their money by exploiting royal financial institutions including selling
offices, advancing loans to the royal government, skimming revenues
off provincial tax flows, speculating in government paper, and investing
in state-sanctioned trading monopolies. George Taylor called this
arrangement "court capitalism" and opposed it to other, more familiar
types of capitalism based in commerce, industry, and real estate.
Economic historian James Riley dubbed the system "capitalism in
public functions," while the historian of French banking, Herbert
Luethy, referred to "regnicole capitalism.'"*" These terms bespeak the
mixture of public power and private entrepreneurship typifying
® Eeonon^ and Society, 2; 1095.
"Types of Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century France," Economic History Kevietv, CCCXI (July
1964): 478-97;James Riley, The Seven Years War and the Old Re^me in France: The Economic and
Financial Toll (Princeton, 1986),
Herbert Luethy, La Banqueprotestante en France, de la
rlvocation de lEdit de Nantes d la Rhobstion, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1959-1961), 2:43. On
financiers, see Julian Dent, Crisis in Finance: Cronm, Financiers and Society in Seventeenth-Century
France (Devon: Newton Abbott, 1973); Francois Bayard, Le Monde desfinanciers cm XVIIe siecle
(Paris: Flammarion,1988); Daniel L>essett,Ar^ent,pouvoiretsodltl au GrandSUcle (Paris: Fayard,
1984); Richard Bonney, The King's Debts: Finance and PoStics in France, 1589-1661 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1981); Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, Let
(Paris:
S.E.V.P.E.N, 1970); and John R.Bosher,H*«ri!iEt«a»«r/770-/795';fvti»S»x(BMr (is
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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.financial capitalism at the heatt of the French patrimonial state in the
old regime.
In his important book on the nobility, Chaussinand-Nogaret used
his findings on nobles and markets to try to refute a Marxistinterpreta
tion that Opposed an enterprising, commercial bourgeoisie to a landed,
"feudal" nobility. Nobles, he wrote, threw off "the weight of tradi
tion" and helped society break out of "'feudal' forms of production."^'
Examination of his evidence, however, suggests that the terms of the
Marxist-revisionist debate fail to explain coherendy the kinds of
activities that he found. Nobles were neither joining the ranks of
"modern capitalism" nor perpetuating "feudal" forms of production.
Rather, they were participating in a vast system of court or statecentered financial capitalism. As Chaussinand-Nogaret himself
observed, shareholders in noble-dominated enterprises consisted
primarily of the "ubiquitous financial office-holders," men "standing
well at Court," and a "circle of army officers." These networks were
enhanced by the "colonisation of the Court by financiers" through the
marriage of daughters of financiers to courtiers. Much of the capital,
furthermore, was "fiscal in origin," and confusion existed "between
public moneys and the financiers' own resources."^^ All of the
characteristics cited by Chaussinand-Nogaret exemplify features of
court capitalism, which, far from overturning privilege, could not have
survived without it.
Viewed from the perspective of the market, the Revolution was
not about the triumph of "capitalism" over "feudalism." Rather, what
the Revolution did was to abolish all sorts of status arrangements in
which capitalism had been embedded. In particular, the Revolution
destroyed court capitalism, the capitalism in public functions, that\ras
at the heart of the French state in the old regime. Much of the
resiliency of court capitalism grew out of the impoverished monarchy's
need for credit, particularly in times of war. Without a public system
of credit, the royal government had relied upon expedients that
crystallized into long-lasting institutions spawning powerful interest
groups. Several institutions were particularly important to court
capitalism in France; venality of offices, tax farming, and government

" French NohiU^,113.
French Nohili^, 101.
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chartered, monopolistic trading companies. All of these institutions
developed out of the chronically weak credit of the French monarchy.
These institutions, or variants of them, were not limited to France.
They could be found in a number of European governments that
enjoyed a certain degree of wealth but had yet not experienced a socalled "financial revolution." The twin English revolutions of the
seventeenth century eradicated the basis of court capitalism in England,
by curbing the arbitrary legal powers of the monarchy, placing state
debt under parliamentary control and creating new mechanisms for
borrovdng at low-term interest rates.^^ In the eighteenth-century, some
French officials recogniaed the fiscal power that the English had
generated by linking consumer confidence to capital markets, but by
then the French crown had surrounded itself with unwieldy institu
tional arrangements from which it could not extricate itself. By 1789
the French government could neither live with court capitalism, nor
without it. The bankruptcy of the monarchy followed, and the
Revolution destroyed what originally had been the financial lifeline of
the early modern state.

^ Venality ^
Venality, the sale of offices by the government, was a centerpiece of
court capitalism. Its story has been well told. From its inception,
venality was denounced as immoral, unwise, and even illegal, but
enough powerful groups had a stake in its development that it evolved

"P. G. M. Dickson, TheFinandal'Rtwltriion in England A Stu^ in the Devehpaent ofPnbEcCre£t,
1688-1756 (London: MacmiUan, 1967); David Stasavage, PubEc Debt and the Birth of the
DemocraEc State:France and Great Britain, 1688—1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003); Bruce Carruthers, City of Ct^tak PoEEcs and Markets in the EngEsh Financial BevoluEon
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Douglas North and Barry Weingast,
"Constitutions and Commitment Evolution of the Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth Century
Journal(f Economic Histo^ 49 (1989): 805-32. For sixteenthcentury Dutch variations seeMarjolein't Hart,Joost Jonker andJan Luiten Van Zanden, eds.,
A FinancialHistoty oftheNetberlands(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) andJames
D. Tracy, A Financial BevoEtEon in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
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into one of the defining features of the eady modern French state.^
Venality exemplified quintessential features of the early modern
patrimonial state. The practice contained capitalist elements of markets
and credit, but the markets confused public power with private
ownership, commodified quasi-moral attributes like status, and rested
in an insecure legal environment. Venality emerged in the king's
domain when the king created charges of prevots to collect revenues
there. Although the charges were leased for a specific period of time,
the prevots began to pass them down to their sons or to recornmend
successors in return for large monetary payments to the monarch. By
the twelfth century, for all practical purposes, royal domanial offices
were considered patrimonial.
These institutional developments did not automatically give rise to
an ongoing market in offices. For that, more "modern" features were
required: greater security in property rights, brokers to coordinate sales
of offices over long distances, a system of banking and credit, and
ongoing consumer demand, that is, enough individuals with money to
purchase offices.''® In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, continual
war, the growth of the state, and commercial development created a
favorable environment. The first steps in formalizing a market were
taken by Fran9ois I, who in 1522 created the bureau desparties casuelles to
serve as, in Loyseau's words, a "boutique for this new merchandise."
The bureau was granted the right to sell newly created and vacated
offices, as well as to collect transfer fees when offices changed hands.'*''
Simultaneously, Francis I created a treasury, the tresor de I'epargne, which
took in revenue from the bureau des parties casuelles. Soon professionals,
the partisans, emerged to sell the offices. Partisans, a type of financier.
** Essential works are Roland Mousnier,ha VlnoMldts offices sous Henri IVetLouis XIII (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1971); William Doyle, Venality: The Sale of Offices in EiffiteenthCentuiy France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); David Bien, "Offices, Corps, and a System
of State Credit: The Uses of Privilege under the Ancien Regime,"in Keith M. Baker, ed.. The
Political Culture ofthe OldPiffme (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), 87-114; and his "Old Regime
Origins of Democratic Liberty," in Dale Van Kley, ed.. The French Idea of Freedom. The Old
Reffme and the Declaration of Rights of1789 Stanford: Stanford Univetsity Press, 1994), 23-71.
See also articles of Bien dted in note 5.
As Konraad W Swart observes in The Sale of Offices in the SeventeenthCentury (The Hague: M.
Nihjoff, 1949), venality never developed in Eastern Europe where commercial capitalism
remained very weak.
Mousnier, Venalite,37. Offices in the king's household and in the military, although subject
to sale, never fell under the control of the bureau des parties casuelles. Mousnier, Vena&te, 117.
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riiade contracts (orpartis) with the king, advanced the king money, and
were reimbursed with offices that they sold themselves. The partisans
quickly developed effective marketing techniques. They gained the
right to scour France with blank receipts endorsed by the monarchy so
that offices could be sold without delay in the vast reaches of the
countryside. By 1586 nearly all offices in the royal judiciary, as well as
certain offices conferring the right to collect the king's revenues, had
been made venal, and in 1588 the Estates of Blois were complaining of
speculation in offices.^^
Meanwhile, officeholders pressured the monarchy to give them
more secure property rights. The chronically impoverished kings, in
effect, sold their agreement. Fran9ois I allowed officers to resign their
offices to a third party in return for a hefty tax equivalent to one-fourth
the value of the office. He added, however, that office-holders had to
live forty days beyond the payment of this fee. During the chaos of the
Wars of Religion, French kings were usually too weak to make sure that
this fee was paid, and many office-holders, especially in the sovereign
courts, ignored it. In 1604 the famous fee known as the droit annuel, the
so-called Paulette after the financier Paulet, was introduced to
regularize the situation. Officers could resign their offices free from
the rule of forty days if they paid a small sum each year equal to one
sixtieth of the value of the office assessed in the royal council. Families
would no longer have to fear that their large monetary investments
would be lost by the unexpected death of an office-holder. Offices
with secure property rights, moreover, would become easier to sell.
The chancellor, Belliere, was so opposed to this routinization of
venality that he refused to sign the arret. He foresaw that the king
would lose the right to choose his own officers and would never be in
the financial position to suppress the system once it was extended.
Henri IV turned a deaf ear. Paulet had made him an advance, and the
king was heavily in debt following the religious wars. In addition, the
monarchy was assured a regular revenue againstwhich he could borrow
from his partisans in moments of financial crisis.^ Thus, firmer
property rights for office-holders, more predictable royal revenues, and
the possibility of an expanded system of credit advanced together.

Mousnier, VSnoBte, 38-40.
^ Mousnier, VinaSte,50-1,233-41.
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Solidification of properly rights in offices laid the foundation for
a huge expansion of the market in offices. So long as offices remained
heritable and did not revert to the king for resale, the government had
to make money by creating and selling new offices. During the Thirty
Years War the number of offices skyrocketed Approximately 15,000
offices existed in 1600; four decades later the number had tripled. In
addition, current officeholders were also subject to forced loans, known
as augmentation des gages, by which they were obligated to increase the
capital invested in their offices, or lose them. Often corps of office
holders bought up new offices just so that interlopers would not be
able to offer competition. More sophisticated credit mechanisms were
devised, so that the king could "anticipate" or borrow against future
revenues from the annuelaad other levies on offices. When the Fronde
broke out in 1648, neatly half of the king's ordinary revenues came
from the parties casuelles*^ Eventually, the financial squeeze on
officeholders and enormous sale of offices produced a political
backlash. Forced loans, the dilution of status stemming from the huge
influx of new officers, and failure to pay the office-holders' gages
(interest owed them by the government) were all reasons why the
parlement of Paris began the revolt known as the Fronde.®"
The reign of Louis XIV following the chaos of the Fronde has
often been presented as a new era in French history, one characterized
by enhanced "centralization" of the state. From a fiscal perspective,
however, the continuation of patrimonial tendencies appears most
striking. At this stage, it \ras not a growth in numbers of offices that
was most important. In 1664 Colbert found that there were 45,780
venal offices of justice and finance; in 1778 Necker's inquiry revealed
that there had been a modest increase to 50,969.®* More important was
that venal offices had become a permanent, routine fixture of the
French state, and that the royal government continued to strengthen
the property rights of office-holders so that they could borrow funds
^ Doyle, VitiuiS^, 6-15; Robin Briggs, Ear/y Modern Prance, 1560-1715 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), 213.
^ Georges Pages, "La venalite des offices dans I'Ancienne France," Rome historique CLXIX
(1932): 477-95; Fran^oise Bayard, "Les financiers de la Fronde," XVII si^e 145 (1979):
353—363; Richard Bonney, "La Fronde: mouvement reformiste ou rebellion corporatiste?"
XVIIe siecle 145 (1984): 323-40.
" Doyle, Venality,59. This does not include offices in the royal household or army, or offices
conferring conunercial monopolies or powers of inspection.
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needed by the crown. In February 1683, the monarchy decreed that
rriortgage information on offices would become public. The goal was
to reassure potential creditors of an office-holder's creditworthiness
and thereby make it easier for officeholders to borrow up to the full
market value of their offices. In this, period, there was also a transition
from officeholders borrowing individually for forced loans (the
augmentation desgages) to borrowing corporately.®^ While these measures
made it easier for the government to tap the financial resources of
office-holders, they also had the effect of enhancing the independence
of venal office-holders, making it virtually impossible to dismiss them.
Because offices were forms of property, legally they could only be
dismantled if officeholders were reimbursed.
Between the Renaissance and the Revolution, then, the monarchy
had succeeded in creating a new market in status and public functions
that was widespread, deeply-rooted, and capable of mobilizing
enormous amounts of capitd. It has been estimated that on the eve of
the Revolution, approximately one of every one hundred adult
Frenchmen owned an office.®^ Needless to say, the growth of this
fiscally and politically generated market fostered the "modernization"
of neither the nobility nor the state. It bred institutional tensions that
played a role in the coming of the Revolution.
One consequence of venality was to tie the fortunes of the French
state directly to the process of social mobility. The French patrimonial
state became a machine for "manufacturing nobles."^'* The more the
state grew and fought wars, the more it created offices for its own
survival, and these offices became the primary routes of legal social
mobility in the old regime. Only a small percentage of the total number
of offices were ennobling, but they were the most coveted and cosdy.
Offices of "secretary of the king" and councillor in sovereign courts
conferred first-degree, that is, transmissible, nobility on the office
holder and his posterity after twenty years of service or death in office.

" Mark Potter,"Good Offices: Intermediation byCorporate Bodies in Early Modem French
Public finance," Tht journal of Economic Hisio^ 60 (2000): 606-7. The officeholder's
consolidation of property rights is explored in more detail in his Corps and Clienteles: Public
Finance and Podtical Change inFrance, 1688—1715 (Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003).
Doyle, Venality, 60; George Taylor estimated that two to three percent of adult males
possessed some kind of office before the Revolution. "Noncapitalist Wealth," 477.
As explored in David Bien's article, "Manufacturing Nobles."
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Certain other judicial ofEces required two generations to complete the
process. It has been calculated that in the period 1774 to 1789, a total
of2,477 men were ennobled. Roughly 350 of them received letters, the
rest had purchased offices.®' All in all, perhaps one-third of all the
nobles in France before the Revolution had been ennobled during the
eighteenth century. Another way to put this is that nearly one-third of
the nobles in the eighteenth century were products, in some form, of
the market in public functions. If one adds to this total the number of
families ennobled through purchase of office in the seventeenth
century, the majority of nobles in France on the eve of the Revolution
were products of this type of market.
Although by the end of Louis XIV's reign, the government created
far fewer new offices, it had strengthened the property rights of
officeholders to such a degree that the production of new nobles had
turned into a predictable feature of the French state. By the late
eighteenth century, wealthy commoners could routinely plan on
purchasing noble status in the same way that they made an investment
in other markets. New techniques of communication made compara
tive shopping over long distances possible. When, in 1784 at the age
of sixty-three, the wealthy merchant Pierre-Daniel Pinet decided it was
time to become noble by buying the office of secretary of the king, he
simply put out an inquiry in the local commercial newspaper, or
Affiches, and received a number of propositions from officeholders
around the country. He decided to purchase an ennobling office from
an individual in Besangon because it cost about half as much as a
similar office attached to a more illustrious parlement elsewhere."
The union of social mobility with officeholding had important,
and contradictory, effects on the cultural definition of nobility. On the
one hand, the widespread diffusion of offices helped to spread the idea
that service to the state, rather than noble birth itself, was the highest
source of honor. As Fran9ois Furet observed some time ago, through

David Bien, "La r&icdon aiistocradque avant 1789," 514; Michael Fitzsinimons has
calculated a similat number: 2,310
between 1772 and 1786, of which only 352 owed
their status to letters. "New Light on the Aristocradc Reacdon in France," French Histoty 10
(1996): 425,427.
Rene Favier,"Un grand bourgeois a Gap a la fin de I'Ancien Regime: Pierre-Daniel Pinet,"
in Michel VoveUe, ed., Bourgeoisies de Province etPJvolsiSon (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de
Grenoble, 1985), 50-51.
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its offices the monarchy "attempted to imbue the kingdom's ruling
classes, henceforth united under its aegis, with a new system of values,
no longer based on personal honor but on the fatherland and on the
State."®' On the other hand, the sale of offices also set in motion
grounds for the delegitimation of a sizeable sector of the nobility.
Although service to king and state in principle justified ennoblement,
many ennobling offices were attractive precisely because they required
no real work. Many of the men who were ennobled by purchase of a
municipal office of capitoulin Toulouse, for example, never set foot in
the town.®' Venality had turned the acquisition of status into a
commodity subject to the associations with "vile gain" and "interest"
that transactions on the market implied. Could those who purchased
ennobling offices claim the honorable qualities—^heroism, generosity,
indifference to monetary worries—that the nobility had traditionally
reserved to itself?
The answer was never straightforward. On the one hand, men
who purchased ennobling offices argued that they had not bought a
noble tide outright; they had purchased an office, usually in the
judiciary, by which they served the state in an honorable capacity.
Nobility was a reward for service. On the other hand, there were those
who denounced the acquisition of status through purchase of office as
a mercenary venture that debased everything for which honor stood.
This was particularly true of the ennobling offices of secretary of the
king, which everyone knew required no real work and hence were the
choice of rich, upwardly mobile financiers and merchants. Montes
quieu expressed both opinions simultaneously. In his Spirit of the ham,
he defended the sale of judicial offices because it inspired industriousness in the state. Those who aspired to honorable state service first
had to prove themselves by acquiring riches. Nonetheless, he railed
against ennoblement of tax farmers: when tax farmers (praitant^ in a
monarchy acquire nobility, he lamented, "the state is ruined...All the
other orders of the state are dissatisfied; honor loses its whole value;
the gradual and natural means of distinction are no longer respected;
" Interpreting the French Revtbrtion, Elborg Fotster, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 103.
" Robert Schneider, "Crown and Capitoulat Municipal Government in Toulouse,
1500-1789," in PhilipBenedict, ed.. CitiesandSoctdChangeinF.arh/ModemFrance (Londonand
Boston: Unwin Hyman,1989), 210-11.
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and the very principle of the government is subverted....Every
profession has its particular lot. That of the tax gatherers is wealth, and
wealth is its own reward."" Thus, for Montesquieu, wealth or
"industriousness" was rightly given its due through ennobling offices,
but along more traditional lines of thinking, it also served as "its own
reward" and thereby could subvert the basis of honor itself.
Despite their drawbacks as a source, the cahiers des doleances of 1789
offer the best sample of collective attitudes toward venal ennoblement
on the eve of the Revolution. In his analysis of492 cahiers (150 clerical,
153 noble and 189 third estate), WiUiam Doyle found that 7.3% of the
clergy, 51.6% of the nobility and 24.3% of the third estate attacked
ennoblement by venal office." The opposition of the nobility to
venality, which tainted and diluted their status, was longstanding and
hardly cause for surprise. Ambiguity within the ranks of the third
estate was also understandable, as some members undoubtedly were
hoping to use venality for their own advance. A debate in Dijon over
this issue is instructive. There one group of lawyers drafted a model
cahier for the province which stipulated that "nobility will not be able
to be acquired for money." Another group of lawyers from the
parlement of Dijon protested: this would serve "to strip all emulation
from the Third Estate and raise a wall of separation between this order
and that of the Nobility.'"''
The cahiers denouncing venal ennoblement, it should be empha
sized, were not opposed to the concept of ennoblement or the
legitimacy of the category of nobility per se. The opposition was to the
idea that nobility could be purchased. Members of all three estates

The Spirit oftheham, trans. Frana Neumann (New York; Hafner Press: 1949), 1.1, bk. 5, ch.
19; t. II, bk. 13, ch. 20. Francois Bluche argues that the lower price of an office in the Parisian
parlement (40,000Urns in 1750) as opposed to the secretary of the King (185,000 Rms) flowed
from the ease of ennoblement by the latter office. The magistrates in the padements had
greater power to accept or reject new members. Aspirants into the nobility paid deady to
avoid the potential htimiliation of rejection by the parlement. Mapfstrats duparlement, 164—65.
VenaUpf, 269. On the problem of the cahiers as a source, see Gilbert Shapiro and John
Markoff 'Revolutionary Demands: a Content Am^sis of the Cahiers de Doleances of 1789 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998).
" R. Robin, "La Loge la Concorde' 41'Orient de Dijon," Annales Historiques de la Rlvolntion
franfaise XLI (1969): 437. Both the cahier of the dty and baHUage of Dijon demanded that
nobility nolonger beable to be acquired "a prixd'argent" Jerome Mavidal, etaL eds.. Archives
parlementaires de1787a 1860,1"series, 1787-99,7 vols. (Paris: Paul Dupont,1867-75), 3:131,
art. 10 and 3:141, art. 9.
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continued to view the nobility as a superior group: to ensure that status
they wanted ennoblement to be solely a reward for service to the state.
In a sample of ninety-five cahiers that denounced venal ennoblement in
the Archives parlementaires, over two-thirds (sixty-six) stipulated that
nobility should be given as a reward for things such as "patriotic virtues
and devotion to public affairs," and "real, public important services."^^
The nature of nobility as a form of "public" recognition, rather than a
royal favor, was underscored in a number of cahiers that stipulated that
the provincial and general estates, rather than the king, should have the
authority to ennoble individuals for important services. Occasionally
in the third estate, there was the more radical sentiment that ennoble
ment should be not only for merit, but also strictly personal and not
transmissible to one's heirs. Among the most progressive thinkers,
then, a dyrtastic concept of nobility was beginning to give way to
individualistic notions of status.
In contrast to the praise accorded ennoblement for meritorious
activity was the denunciation of nobility acquired by money. Many
cahiers simply demand that ennoblement by venal charge or purchase be
prohibited, but some cahiers were more explicit. The cahiers of the city
of Angouleme and of the nobility of Basse-Marche both used the word
rougir,"to blush," when discussing the effect that venal avenues into the
nobility had on individuals. The parish of Saint-Mexme-les champs in
the province of Tourraine observed that it was humiliating for
members of the third estate and harmful to the public welfare to see
men, as soon as they obtained a small fortune, leave their estate, take
on noble airs, and cease being useful to their country.®' In FrancheComte a pamphleteer in 1789 summed up the problem of squaring
noble honor with the principle of the market. With the advent of
"venal nobility," he wrote, "merit was nothing more than a base piece
of parchment; everything was put up for auction...it was truly a
nobility to the highest bidder."®^
^ I composed this sample by consulting the faAterr listed in the index under "Demandes tendant
da que la noblesse ne ptasse s'acquUrirpar charge et i prix d'argent" 7: 577-78.
Archives parlementaires, 2:12, art. 12; 3:677; 6:57, art. 17.
" 'Reflexions d'un citopen de Franche-Comtl sur lespritnUges et immunitls de la noblesse (s.p., 1789). A
citizen in Besan^on contrasted the positive value of nobility received as reward for duty with
the "fiscal nobility that the nation can not hasten too quickly to repress." Cited by Patrice
H^onnet, Class, Ideology, andthe Rights ofNobles During the French 'Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981), 50. The old nobility had always attacked ennoblement by venal office. In 1789,
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If the denunciation of purchaseable nobility was one effect of
venality, a second was the blurring of private and public spheres. It is
common to associate the rise of the state and market with greater
differentiation between the realm of official duty and personal
discretion. Because venal offices conflated rights of jurisdiction and
property, however, the growth of the so-called "cash nexus" in this
sector did not help to generate an impersonal civic order:it fostered the
opposite. It allowed men, in effect, to purchase and own sections of
public authority. It is true that in discussing venal offices jurists always
retained some distinction between public authority, which the king
retained, and private patrimony, over which the individual had
discretion. Loyseau stressed the difference in 1610 when he declared
that venality of offices did not confer right "in the office, but a simple
right to the office." Because technically the royal domain was inalien
able, the king always retained a right of repurchase over offices: "the
officeholder was the usufructor," observes one historian, "and only that
use was salable and inheritable... .Dynastic officialdom never enjoyed
the kind of seigneurial right in the exercise of public power that was
characteristic of the feudal age."®^ Nonetheless, ongoing practice made
the technical distinction between office and patrimony obscure, to say
the least.Originally jurists classified offices as meubles, moveable
property that was consumed through use. As the inheritance rights of
the annuelheatme institutionalixed, jurists changed their classification
to immeuhles, a kind of real estate, including land and houses, susceptible
of being mortgaged. The status of immmble also gave widows rights to
the property of an office after a husband's death.®'

the comte de Setrant, who enjoyed a long, distinguished old lineage,appealed to commoners
over heads of bourgeois leaders. "Let the peopledistrust thenewly-ennobled, whose so-called
rights are but the Dead Sea ftuits of the extravagance of kings," John McManners, French
Ecclesiastical Society Underthe Ancien Riffme; a Stu^ of Angers in the Eighteenth Centtny (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1960), 11.
" Ralph Giesey, "Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary
France," American Historical Reinein82 (1977), 283.
" Mousnier contrasts the legal fiction that offices were not a patrimony with actual practice
and observes that officers did not consider their charges "comme une fonction, mais comme
un bien que Ton exploite." VlnaUtl,Tb.
" Technically, offices and rentes constitnees were classified as immeuhlesfictifs, that is, immeuhles
by fiction of law. Marcel Marion, Dictionnaire des insHtuHons de la France aux XVJIe et XVIIIe
siecle (Paris: A. Picard, 1923), 281. Mousnier traces how this legal status evolved in Venalite,
494-96, 502-04.
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One result of this situation was to bind the fortunes of office
holders to the fate of the state. In his exploration of the wealth of
office-holders in the seventeenth century, Mousnier showed how
important investment in the state had become. In half of his sample,
land constituted a greater portion of the officeholder's wealth than did
rentes and offices, but in the next fourth of the cases, land, rentes and
offices were of equal importance; and in the last fourth, offices and
rentes had the upper hand. The large amount of money tied up in
offices explains why it was so critical that the king secure their property
rights and allow them to seU or bequeath their offices. No one would
have put such large sums into an investment that could be repudiated
and lost too easily. The importance of rentes and offices also serve as
a reminder that noble office-holders were far more vulnerable to the
effects of a government bankruptcy than were more traditional landed
nobles. Parisian parkmentaires were particvdarly drawn toward invest
ments in governmental rentes, which helps to explain their growing
alarm over the enormous, high-interest loans that the crown was
contracting in the half decade before the Revolution.®®
A third effect of venality follows: in expanding the system so
widely, the patrimonial state helped to create a huge network of
officeholders whose interests were bound up with die state, while
simultaneously spawming its own opposition. It has been argued that
venality was one means by which the monarchy and officeholders
worked together to siphon off revenues generated by the lower
classes.®' It cannot be denied that some officeholders, especially at the
top of the system, could reap large rewards from the system. Yet too

Mousnier, VinaUtt, 490. A sample of eighteen magistrates in the parlement of Paris by
Francois Bluche showed that, on average, offices constituted 23.4% of the office-holders'
fortunes. He also estimates more generally that perhaps two thirds of Parisian parltmenUdres
had importantplacements in nntes, especially those of the hotelde ville. LesMaffstmts duparlement
de Paris au XVIIIe sikle (1715-1771) (Paris: Les Belles Letttes, 1960), 163, 215, 215. The
Parlement of Languedoc showed a similar trend toward a substantial investment in rentes,
although the rentes were often those of the province and clergy, not the Parisian hotel de ville.
Jean Sentou, Fortunes etgroupes sociaux d Toulouse sous la Ftvolution (Toulouse: E. Privat, 1969),
106-07. Daniel Dessert's analysis of the wealth of 87 financiers, the most socially mobile
group in the old regime, reveals that only two had over 20% of their assets in land; twentythree had over 20% of their fortune in offices in
Argent,pouvnr et sodeti, 135-42.
"This has been common in a certain Marxist interpretation. See Perry Anderson, Lineages of
the Absolutist State (London: NLB, 1974); William Beik, Absolutism and Sodeiy in Seventeenth-Centmy France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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much emphasis on cooperation between king and office-holders may
obscure the real differences of interest that various groups had.
Because the royal government was a notoriously bad cre^t risk,
officeholders were placed in a dangerous position. In moments of
fiscal stress, it was common for the crown to delay the payment of
interest owed to them on their investment and to demand forced loans.
The monarchy could only do this because it could hold the status and
jurisdiction craved by the officeholders hostage and threaten them vwth
loss of their office if they did not comply. Although the monarchy
gained resources in theshort term, over thelong term theparlementaires,
and the rest of the judiciary underwent an enormous expansion and,
particularly at the top, carved out a highly independent base of
operation. The trend over two centuries, therefore, was for the
monarchy to tame the great "feudal" magnates and quell their rebel
lions, only to face another opponent that it had in part fashioned itself,
the parlementaires. It was the parlement of Paris which began the
Fronde, which Louis XIV took pains to silence during his wars, which
revived under the Regency following the Sun-King's death, and which
Maupeou attempted unsuccessfully to abolish in 1771. One contempo
rary observer who reali2ed theimportance of theparlemeniaires'^to^crtY
rights was the abbe Veri. Although he was sympathetic to Maupeou's
goals, he also thought that the minister had made a critical error when
he failed to reimburse magistrates in the parlement of Paris for their
offices after suppressing them. "That was an illegal and unjust attack
against property," observed the abbe, "in a time when the word
property was becoming sacred in every mouth." He thought that the
failure of Maupeou's coup could largely be traced to harsh policy.™ The
problems with officeholders culminated with the May Edicts of 1788,
which suppressed many lower-level judicial offices, trimmed parlementary authority through jurisdictional reorganization, and, in the process,
helped to usher in the Revolution.
Given this situation, it may be helpful to revise George Taylor's
famous dichotomy between "capitalist" and non-capitalist or "prdpri-

™Joseph-Alphonse Veri,/o*r»a/<iir/"aAi/iir Veri,Jehan de Witte, ed., 2 vols. (Paris: Editiofls
Jules Tallandier, s.d.) 1: 73. John Hurt emphasized how much thepartements suffered fiscally
and politically at the hands of Louis XIV in Lams XIV and the Partements: the AssertionofRtffal
Asrthoritf (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
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etaiy" wealth^' Taylor argued that capitalist wealth consisted of
volatile and insecure business investments, whereas "non-capitalist
wealth" was composed of safe and predictable investments in land,
offices and rentes. Yet government offices and rentes, we have seen,
were not always such safe investments. A combination of royal
bankruptcy and outright abolition of many judicial offices, without a
firm plan for reimbursement by a destitute government, helped to
usher in the French Revolution. It might be more accurate, then, to
divide "non-capitalist" wealth into land and other safe private invest
ments, on the one hand, and government offices and rentes, which were
subject to manipulation and even repudiation by the crown, on the
other. Even then, it is questionable whether offices and rentes should
be classified as "non-capitalist," since the credit network of the
government, of which these were a part, had capitalist elements.
Offices might better be considered a hybrid form of property which
combined an investment of capital in the government with the
acquisition of status and political authority. The insecure and hybrid
nature of property in offices, in turn, suggests a different perspective
on the relationship of property rights to the Revolution. The Revolu
tion both removed elements of private ownership from government
functions in order to make government truly "public," and it gave
greater security of possession to reconstituted private property..
Finally, venality turned economic divisions between rich and poor
nobles into durable professional divisions, at least where service to the
state was concerned. According to Chaussinand-Nogaret, about 40
percent of the nobility were able to live decendy if they were frugal.
Another 20 percent faced actual poverty, some of them even destitu
tion.^^ Because nearly all forms of service to the state were mediated
through the purchase of office, impoverishment also effectively denied
nobles the opportunity for government service. The situation was most
critical in the army officer corps, supposedly the professionpar excellence
of the nobility. As the marquis de CrenoUe stated, the nobility was

" See footnote 4.
"The standatd applied by historians to measure noblepoverty is 500 Bvres or less income. For
the overall picture see Chaussiiiand-Nogaret, French NebiSty, 52-53. In isolated or
economically underdeveloped areas the number of poor nobles was even higher. See Dewald,
PontesC-Pierre, 97—8; and Steven G. Reinhardt, JmBce in the Sarladais, 1770-1790 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State Umversity Press, 1991), 42—43.
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made for military command; "when subjects made for another
profession occupy the place of nobles, it is a contravention of the rule
established by the sovereign."^^

¥ The Army: Military Venality and
Court Connections ^
The government's acceptance ofmilitary venality was a development
of Louis XIV's reign. The policy was actually a reform designed to
curb problems of the past when sale of military offices was illegal, but
practiced on a black market with dire consequences for military
readiness. By allowing the sale of a commission and giving military
officers greater security of tenure, officers had more incentive toinvest
their own money into the king's army. They, or their heirs, could
recoup their investment upon retirement or death in battle. The plight
of the poor noble who could not afford this financial sacrifice was
considered, and not all commissions in the army were made venal.
Nonetheless, the commissions that were subject to purchase, those of
captain and colonel, which conferred command of a company and a
regiment, respectively, provided the fastest route to the top.^"* In the
eighteenth century, a company could cost between 6,000 and 14,000
livres, a cavalry regiment could rim as much as 120,000 livres or more in
the most prestigious corps, while a charge in the elite Military House
hold of the King {la Maison Militaire du Jlo/) might require a staggering
500,000 livres?^ Over the next century, the system of military purchase
helped to harden a demorali2ing divide between nobles with money

" L. Tuetey Ijts qffiders sous I'anden ri^e: nobhs it roturiers (Paris, 1908), 242. "The nobility,"
wrote one army reformer in 1781, "knows noother
no other profession than that of arms:
this prejudice is such that oxejginlilhomme'oAiO cannot obtain a post in the troops remains back
in his province without an (Sat and without an occupation.""Reflexions generales sur la
constitution actuelle du corps militaire" (1781), cited by Tuetey, 1.
Unlike offices in the judiciary, theseposts operated outside the jurisdiction of the bureau des
parties casuelksand thus were not heritable, although thegovernment often gave permission for
a relative of a deceased officer to assume ownership. On the acceptance ofvenality within the
military under Louis XIV, see Rowlands, DyaasdcState and theArpsy,161-71.
" See the table in Forster, House of Saubs-Tavams, 42, and Raef Blaufarb, The 'French Am^,
1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 29.
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able to advance quickly through the ranks, and poor, but experienced,
ofEcers who lacked the means to do so.
Venality in the military gave military officers a great deal of
independence in relation to their superiors. As one historian of the
Seven Years War observed, "Though [a commander] led the 'King's
Army,' in a very real sense that army was not royal property, but the
possession of proprietary colonels and captains who trained,equipped,
and led their own men."^® As in the case of judicial officeholders, the
return for this independence was financial aid gleaned by the monarchy.
The royal government gave captains a stipend to recruit, equip, and
house their companies, and under ideal circumstances, they might be
able to come out slightly ahead. In wartime, however, the financial
obligations could be crushing. During the Seven Years War, cavalry
and dragoon captains raised 2,000,000 livres from private sourceis to
keep their troops fed and equipped in the field.'^
The profound demoralization of the officer corps led the military
reformer the due de Choiseul to transfer supply of food and recruit
ment of men from proprietary captains to agents of the state. Venality
was curtailed, although it remained in the cavalry and the corps of the
King's Household. By curbing the financial burden of military service,
Choiseul hoped to allow poor nobles to serve in the army and fulfill the
honorable duty to which their elevated station called them. In the
1770s, another reforming war minister, the comte de Saint-Germain,
continued the battle against the remaining pockets of venality, which
were allowing sons of wealthy new nobles to buy their way into the
military.
The reformers' attacks on military vehaHty was simultaneously an
indictment of venality in the judicial and financial sectors. Wealthy
commoners, often financiers, purchased ennobling offices so that their
newly elevated sons could enter the officer corps. As one anonymous
critic wrote, purchase of commissions left experienced, but poor,
officers "to languish in the subaltern grades" where they were
"subordinated to people whose sole advantage consists in their
fortune."^® The system also upset traditional rankings. Saint-Germain
™ Lee Keimett, TA< French Armies in the Seven Years' War (Durham; Duke University Press,
1967), 35.
" Blaufarb, French Army, 27.
™ Blaufarb, French Amy, 28.
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decried "the sons of.big merchants of Lyon, of farmers generals and
of receiversdesfinances, who, thanks to their money or alliances contracted
with great houses, care to place themselves on the same line and Haim
the same rights [as nobles]."'®
The problems with military venality were more easily identified
than uprooted. The patrimonii state had always lived off the credit
and resources of its servants. As the Marquis de Castries observed, "to
deprive [the king] of...the credit of the captains would take from him
a precious resource." Incapable of reimbursing officers the sums they
had invested, the chronically impoverished state had only limited
avenues for reform. Saint-Germain had to settle for a policy of
reducing the price of remaining venal companies by one quarter with
each change of ownership. In 1791 there was still nearly 50,000,000
livres bound up in military charges.®®
Military venality was not the only aspect of the military system
demoralizing to provincial nobles of mediocre fortune. At the heart of
the patrimonial state lay the king's own household, the court at
Versailles, where the interests of the great courtiers, who often
possessed both immense wealth and distinguished lineage, continually
thwarted efforts at reform. After 1760 presentation at court was
necessary to obtain a colonelcy, so that this grade and above remained
the preserve of the great nobles with court connections.®^ The
enormously expensive, decorative units of the King's Military House
hold, meanwhile, served only to mark the elevated status of favored
courtiers. Despite their purely social function, these posts gave
courtiers the right to enjoy rank in the regular army where they flaunted
their titles and disrupted a rational structure of command. Well aware
of the problems that these snobbish and coddled officers caused. Saint
Germain tried to curb their number but was successful in eliminating
only 750 of the approximately 10,000 places. At the end of the old
regime, the army suffered from a two-track system of promotion, a
slow one for poor and middling nobles who performed the real work
of the army, and a fast one that essentially conferred social distinction

" Quoted by Raef Blaufarb, "Aristocratic Professionalism in the Age of Democratic
Revolution: The French Officer Corps, 1750^1815," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1996), 56.
^ Blauferb, French Amff,28-29; quotation of de Castries at 28.
Tuetey, Offiders, 101.
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on the so-called "hens courtisans.
On the eve of the Revolution,
nobles on the slow track were deeply disillusioned by their inability to
advance and by the disdain ks grands displayed toward them. In
September 1789 a petition to the National Assembly signed by fifty-one
noble military officers from the Regiment of Foret summed up the
anger common to this group. "Deign to let your regard fall on one of
the most useful but from all times the most maltreated classes; we have
rights like citizens."®^

^ Financiers and Capitalism in
Public Functions ^
A last market category involves cases where the royal government
entered into formal business arrangements to lease or farm out tasks to
private corporations of entrepreneurs. The latter paid the royal
government an agreed amount for the right to perform a designated
task, such as collecting taxes, and pay all expenses generated by their
work. In return, they were able to keep any profits generated over and
above the lease price. Two general characteristics of this system are
noteworthy. First, just as in the case of judicial and military venality,
sovereign functions passed into quasi-private hands. In lieu of a
professional, salaried corps of state officials, the royal government
relied on profit-making companies to carry out central tasks of the
state. To enforce compliance on the part of the populace and to
enhance the entrepreneurs' ability to make a profit, the government
also gave these men privileges and powers, such as the right to set up
a police force or requisition supplies, otherwise reserved togovernment
itself. Second, the profits attached to these sectors were often
enormous and offered the quickest route to social mobility in the old
regime. The vast majority of non-noble financiers, munitionnaires, tax
farmers, and receivers acquired nobility as fast as possible by purchas
ing offices of secretary of the king.

Blaufarb, FrtncbAn^, 29-37. For the reference to "heros," see the "Memoire de Kerolio,"
ArOiim de la Guerre,1 M. 1716.
" AG, 1 M 1907, JUelamaHons des offiders du R^. de Eeret.
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The bread contractors, for the military, known as mmitionnaires,
were paid a flat fee for each ration supplied. By the time of the Seven
Years VGhr, the governments of England, Austria, and Prussia had all
moved to more centralized, direct control over the supply of food and
uniforms to their armies. Why did France remain bound up with a
niore inefficient system of farming out these functions? The reason
was financial: private companies of entrepreneurs were able to borrow
money to provide their services even if the government could not pay
its bills, which was usually the case. After the Seven Years War the
government owed one company of munitioneers 15,512,726 livres for
provisions for the army. The banking role of munitioneers, in turn,
paved the road to meteoric social advance. The most famous example
was that of the Paris brothers, sons of a poor Dauphine tavernkeeper,
who made an immense fortune by supplying bread to the army during
the War of the Spanish Succession. Paris de Montmartel, godfather to
the king's mistress, the Marquise de Pompadour, became a powerful
financier in Louis XV's court. His brother Paris Duverney supplied the
army and was so intent on handing out advice on military operations
that he was dubbed "General of the Flour Bags."®"*
The royal government also farmed out the collection of indirect
taxes (the salt tax, tolls, customs duties and other taxes on the sale and
circulation of goods) to a consortium of tax farmers for a fixed sum.
The consolidation of disparate tax farmers into an efficient syndicate
occurred during Louis XIV's reign when Colbert set up the company
of Farmers General, who bid for the right to collect indirect taxes in
the region known as the Five Great Farms. Collecting indirect taxes
was big business. In 1770, the Farmers General employed close to
30,000 people, which made it the largest employer in eighteenthcentury France after the military services.®® The lower rungs of the
General Farms had a semi-bureaucratic form of organization, including
a hierarchically organized system of grades, salaried employees who did
not own their offices, and, after 1780, evaluation of personnel
according to efficiency reports and related data. The elite core of the
organization, however, was proprietary and contractual rather than
French Armies, 8-9,111-12,130; George Matthews,(New
York: Columbia University, 1958), 241;for ties of Pompadour to financiers, Yves Durand, Let
Fermiersgeneraux au XVIHe stick (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), 221—22.
" Matthews, ^qyal General Farms, 207.
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bureaucratic in nature. It was formed by the forty to sixty financiers,
the General Farmers, who invested equal capital shares in the company.
After 1767, one share cost the astronomical sum of 1,560,000 lims.
Since few men could finance this through their own wealth, most
General Farmers had a coterie of financial backers {croupier^ behind
them, each of whom received a cut (crotpe) from the farmer's profits.
Although many of these investments were simple business arrange
ments, the system was open to abuse, especially since favor at court
was often instrumental in gaining a share in the company. As a result,
it was common for an aspiring General Farmer to find that he had to
share his profits with a royal croupier, even if the latter had not invested
the full sum demanded of other backers. One of the company's most
notorious leases from the royal government, the Lease David of 1774,
contained payments totaling 400,000 livres a year to members of the
court, including the king himself.®^
Tax farming was often denounced, but the line of credit extended
by the General Farms to the monarchy was so important that little
could be done to change the system. When the government had
expenditures exceeding its income from the Farmers General's lease,
the Farmers General provided the crown with loans to tide it over.
The Farmers General then deducted the amount of the loan, plus
interest charges, from future lease prices. The Farmers General were
able to raise money to extend to the government either by tapping the
private wealth of their members or by issuing interest-bearing bills
{billets des fermes, similar to Treasury BiUs) purchased by the wider
investing public. By the end of the old regime, the Company of
General Farmers held the staggering amount of 68,400,000 lims of
long-term government debt.*^ Croupes and high interest rates made the
system cosdy. In general, the Farmers General were able to borrow at
five per cent, but received interest from six to ten per cent on funds
advanced to the government.®® The immense debt meant that the royal
government was held prisoner by its creditors. The lack of a national
bank, the monarchy's poor credit rating, and chronic need for speedy
loans made it impossible to dispense with the Farm's services.

" Matthews, 'Reyal Central Farms, 208-9,230-37.
" Matthews,
Gf«<ra/jR2raM, 13-15.
" Dutand, Fermiers Genlratix, 163-64.
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The Receivers General formed a second important agency of tax
collection; these men, too, doubled as state bankers. While the General
Farmers collected indirect taxes, the Receivers General dealt in direct
taxes, such as the taille, capitation^ and vin^tieme. They did not form a
syndicate Uke the Farmers General. Instead they were bound up in the
system of venality: each Receiver purchased his office. Receivers were
sent taxes from local collectors and forwarded them to the government
after deducting a fee of 4 to 6 percent for their efforts.®^ The sums
available to the monarchy from the sale of these offices and their
required surety bonds alone were enormous. A report to the Finance
Committee of the National Assembly in 1789 listed the price of the
offices of the Receivers General and related venal treasurers and
accountants at 119,178,835 Hms.^
The rise of the Receivers as sources of royal credit dated back to
1559, when a consortium of Lyonnais bankers, who had loaned money
to the monarchy, crashed. In reaction, the monarchy turned toward its
own tax receivers for advances. The Receivers borrowed from the
public based upon their own vast personal assets and the revenues
flowing to them through their offices and advanced the king short-term
loans at relatively high interest rates, around 15 percent in the midseventeenth century. The mixing of public and private monies
characteristic of patrimonialism was endemic to this system. The
Receivers speculated with the royal revenues that flowed through their
hands, but their own vast private wealth allowed them to borrow on
the king's behalf, as their credit was more secure than that of the king.
Periodically in times of royal financial crisis, both the Receivers
and Farmers General became severely overextended, found themselves
unable to honor claims on them by their creditors, and were unable to
issue more promissory notes of their own for lack of public confidence.
Then, as John Bosher notes, "they were bankrupt and the whole system
of short-term credit collapsed."®' A shortage of short-term credit
occurred at the outset of the Fronde in August 1648, at the end of
Louis XIV's reign, in 1770 with Terray's bankruptcy, and in 1788 when
Lomenie de Brienne was forced to call the Estates General. The credit

" Matthews, Rgw/ General Farms, 27. The essential study is Bosher, French Finances.
Bosher, French Finances, 256.
" Bosher, French Finances,13; see also Matthews, GeneralFarms, 13-14,32-3.
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of tax farmers and receivers helped to keep the monarchy afloat for
over two centuries, but at a cost of high interest rates and a highly
decentralized financial system unaccountable to the royal government.
Chartered trading companies, such as the East and West Indies
companies, offer a final example of markets created by the patrimonial
state. During his tenure as Louis XIV's controller general, Colbert
made the establishment of overseas trading and a colonial empire a
priority. To finance this costly venture, Colbert turned to a combina
tion of private enterprise a,nd royal privilege. In 1664, he established
the East Indies Company by royal charter. Most merchants saw the
new company as an unwelcome, privileged competitor that would harm
their own commercial opportunities and accordingly resisted. When
Colbert threatened them with loss of other privileges, however,
including the end to the prerogatives of the bourgeoisie of Bordeaux,
the capital was eventually subscribed. Nonetheless, the majority of the
investors in Colbert's trading companies remained court nobles, tax
farmers, venal officeholders and members of the royal family, men who
"hoped something from royal favor or feared something from royal
wrath."'^ Colbert's voluntary subscription was essentially a forced loan
from the ranks of patrimonial officiddom.
Adniinistratively the East Indies Company was virtually a state
within the state. It had the right to mainfain troops and name officers
to command them, to procure arms and munitions, to send ambassa
dors in the name of the king to indigenous rulers, to conclude peace
treaties with these rulers, and even to declare war on them.'^ During
peacetime, monopolies exercised by the company could be lucrative.
From 1726 to 1743, the protected commerce in beaver skins generated
effective profits of 26 percent, over twice the normal profits for
transatlantic trade. Licencing fees and royalties diverted a good portion
of this profit from the colonial merchants into the hands of state
officials, financiers, and shareholders in the Indies Company itself.®"*
^ Glenn J. Ames, Colbert, Mercantilism and the French Quest for Asian Trade (Dekalb: Norther
Illinois University Press, 1996), 25; Henri Weber, La Compaffsiefranfaise des Indes, 1605—1875
(Paris, 1904),121-30.
Stewart L. Mims, Colbert's West India FoUy (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1912), 68-69.
After the end of Louis XIV's wars, the West Indies and East Indies Companies merged to
form the Indies Company.
'•* Dale Miquelan, Nev France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto: McClellend and
Stewart, 1987), 78-81.
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During wartime, however, the Indies Company paid a price for its
monopolies and related governmental powers. The royal government
assumed that chartered companies woiild bear much of the burden for
defending their territories. Between 1724 and 1756 the Indies
Company navy undertook five military expeditions on behalf of the
crown. During the Seven Years War, the company borrowed 12
million livres in order to arm a flotilla to India. In 1769, when the
government decided to end the privileges of the bankrupt company,
Necker argued that the economic problems of the company were not
a consequence of its monopolistic privileges, as the physiocrats wished
to claim. Rather the Indies Company had served as "the bureau of war
of the department of India."'^

^ The Changing Economic CKmate ^
As the above examples have revealed, markets created by the patrimo
nial state fostered the privatization of public functions in every
significant sphere of state authority: judicial, military, financial and
mercantile. The result was the institutional entrenchment of privileged
interest groups with royally guaranteed property rights, accelerated
patterns of social mobility, a bloated judiciary, monopolistic royallycharted companies, and a government heavily indebted to its financiers
and officeholders. State-sanctioned markets also influenced the rise
and reproduction of different kinds of nobles—army officers, royal
judges, and financiers-all of whom were forced to invest in property
guaranteed by the state. Nonetheless, an interesting features of the
French variant of patrimonialism is that the monarchy never was
completely overwhelmed by the transfer of sovereign functions into
personal, entrepreneurial hands. The monarchy always retained a
theoretical monopoly on sovereignty, and eventually it was royal
ministers in the king's council, all of them noble, who led the attack on
" Weber, Compagnie jraH(mse dts Iitdes, 203-14, 513, 518-19, 540, 562, 570; for Necker's
defense of the company, 603-08. The West Indies Company had also run up huge debts to
pay for Louis XIVs wars. In 1666 war. wth En^and "called into play all the company's
capital and all of its resources for the military defense of the islands, and thus made it
impossible tp use them for the development of its commerce." Mims, Colbert's West Indies
PoBiy, 122.
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patrimonial practices. The attempts of Choiseul and Saint-Germain to
uproot venality in the military, Maupeou's suppression of parlements
in 1771, and Necker's efforts to eliminate offices in the royal household
and to curb the independence of venal financial officials are cases in
point. From this perspective, the clamorous period of reform after the
debacle of the Seven Years War might best be characterized as various
sectors of the patrimonial state at war against themselves.
The contradiction can be traced back at least to the reign of Louis
XIV. The Sun-King, whose fiscal policies did so much to dismember
his own exalted claims to sovereignty, also helped to create an incipient
bureaucracy of intendants that never escaped venality completely, but
whose job was to glean information for the king and enforce his will.'^
Over time, this network of officials was important not only for
coordinating the kingdom's center with its periphery, but for helping
to change expectations of what kind of rule was desirable. Royal
reformers like Turgot held up as an ide^ a kingwho was sovereign, but
who also governed in a far more impersonal, predictable, and scientific
manner than his baroque forebears.'^
Along with this evolving bureaucratic ethos in the monarchy came
a new appreciation of the value of freeing up markets. Markets did not
only increase national wealth; it was now argued by royal reformers, like
the important group surrounding Vincent de Gournay, that they served
an important social purpose by uniting different groups of people
through networks of exchange.®® This could only be done if monopo
lies and other barriers to the free movement of goods were lifted.
Property rights, of course, had to be respected, but the definition of

"• Intendants were diosen from men who had usually purchased the venal office of mmtn dts
requites, but the exercise of the intendancy itself was a revocable commission. For oneattempt
to trace the change from personal clientage to more impersonal officialdom, see Sara
Chapman, Private Ambition and Political Alliances: the Philypeaux Pontchartrain Family and Louis
XIV's France (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004). On Colbert's patronage
network see Daniel Dessert and Jean-Louis Journet, "Le lobby Colbert un royaume ou une
affaire de fm)iIle?"Annales, economies, societis,citdlisations'iQ (1975):1303-36 On the career path
of intendants see Vivian Gruder, The PacyalProvincial Intendants: a Govemii^ Elite in EighteenthCentuty France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).
"See, for example, Keith Michael Baker, Inventing theFrench devolution(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1990), ch. 5,"French Political Thought at theAccession of Louis XIV,"and
ch. 7, "Science and Politics at the End of the Old Regime."
" See Simone Meysonnier, La Balance et Fhorloge: la genlse de lapensle libirale au XVIIIe sieck
(Montreuil: Editions de la Passion, 1989).
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property tights was shifting toward a more individualistic and utilitarian
calculus of land, labor, and contracts. Eventually in the Revolution this
view could be used to purge property of extra-economic aspects like
claims to status and political authority, although distinctions as to what
constituted "natural" rights in property could remain rather murky.®®
In terms of finance, the royal government still acted as a predator,
but it also started to see benefits of being a gender consumer. Around
the time of the War of the Austrian Succession and Seven Years War,
the monarchy turned away, although not entirely, from the forced loans
characteristic of an earlier period and began to move toward voluntary
lending from a wider public.'"" This was evident in the declining value
of venality, noted earlier, as a percentage of eighteenth-century war
finance and the greater use of government annuities {rentes) sold to the
public. Before the Fronde, it was common for rentes to be held by royal
officials, who were often obligated to purchase them as a kind of
forced loan.'"' After Louis XIV, coercive elements decreased, while
those designed to create confidence in exchange on the market
increased. The royal government stahilixed the currency, and in 1724
it set up a stock exchange where commodities and government
securities could be bought and sold in a regulated, lawful manner. In
1747 the controller general Machault took measures to increase the
Kquidity of royal rentesperpetuelles, that is, to make possible their sale to
another party, in order to increase the potential pool of investors in the
government.'"^
With enhanced liquidity, more intermediaries were needed.
Notaries, who sold well over half of theinitial emissions of government
rentes, filled this role by developing sophisticated techniques to match
up lenders with borrowers across regional and even national divides.

"Thomas E. Kaiser, 'Troperty, Sovereignly, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the
Tradition of French Jurisprudence" in Baker, ed., Frtnch Idea of Freedom, 300-39.
loo "Prance elected to finance the Seven Years War not in the fashion ordinarily associated
with old regime monarchies—^involuntary taxes, requisitions, or forced loans—^but by a resort
to voluntary lending." Riley, Seven Years War, 148.
James-Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absoktism; Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Centsay France
(Berkeley; University of California Press,1988), 97.
On the importance of stable currency, Thomas Kaiser, 'Money, Despotism, and Public
Opinion in Early Eighteenth-Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit,"
jotsmal of Modem Histoty 63(1991): 691—722;on the stock exchange and Machault,Rene Bigo,
Les Bases historiques de lafinance modeme (Paris, 1933), 107,151-56.
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As investment in government securities became more accessible, the
Ipnfling public become more diverse both in geographical and social
tfftns Although the royal government continued to rely on tax
farmers, receivers and other venal officeholders for credit, it also
tapped foreign money markets more extensively, particularly under
Necker's ministry. Analysis of notarial records reveals that by the
1780s approximately sixty percent of the government's rentes wttt held
outside of Paris by provincials and foreigners. Although lendii^ to the
government was still largely an affair of the elite, by the end of the old
regime Parisian seamstresses, servants, and wage earners were buying
up government-issued rentes}^^ More French subjects, not to mention
foreigners, had bound their financial futures to the royal government
than ever before.
Wooing investors at large required that the royal government
begin to adopt an ethic of financial responsibility and shed its tradi
tional aristocratic nonchalance toward debt. As late as 1715 it had been
claimed that the king had no obligation to honor the debts of his
predecessors.'"'* Indeed, a more business-oriented mentality that
emphasized the importance of meeting's one's obligations seemed to
be filtering down even io the lower classes. In the 1760s in Burgundy,
shopkeepers had not charged interest on credit extended to nobles; by
the 1780s even small merchants generally did so.'"' As time went on,
government officials were more open about the need to preserve the
sanctity of government credit by not defaulting, and reformers began
applying the old aristocratic language of honor to a new goal: that of

On the critical role of notaries for the extension of credit markets, Hoffman, et. al., Priakss
Markets, 111, 170. Participation of artisans in government credit markets can also be seen in
Burgundy, where funds lent by traders, craftsmen and professionals to the provincial estates
rose from 17% in the period 1660-1713 to 27%in theperiod 1727-89. Mark Potter and JeanLaurent Rosenthal, "Politics and Public Finance in France: The Estates of Burgundy,
1660-1789,"/wraa/ oflnterdiscipUnaty History, XXVII (1997): 594-606. On Dutch investors,
James Riley, "Dutch Investment in France, \7S\S7," Jotimal of Econorrrie History 33 (1973):
733-57; for Parisian seamstresses, Clare Crowston, Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old
R/gawr France (167S—1791) (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): 378-79; on Parisian
servants and the place of public credit in the consumer revolution more generally, Daniel
Roche, The People of Paris: An Essaji in Popular Culture in the I8th Century, trans, Marie Evans
(Berkeley. University of California Press, 1987), 82-85. Both Crowston and Roche stress the
^ importance of the royal government's new use of rentes viageres, discussed below.
Louis de Rouvroy, due de Saint Simon, Memoires (Paris: Pleiade ed., 1959), 784.
Forster, House of Sautx-Tar/anes, 128-31.
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guaranteeing the country's debt. The debt itself was now described
more frequently as a "national," rather than pmrely monarchical,
obligation, even by members of the royal government itself."^ By the
1760s, the patrimonial state, conceived of as the "king's state" and
"his" officials, v^s beginning to wane. Or perhaps more accurately, the
monarchy was beginning to lay the infrastructure for more modern
forms of borrowing and communication alongside the. powerful
interests of venality, tax farming, and court financiers that it had also
fostered and to which it remained deeply indebted.

^ Creating Conditions for Speculation ^
A central fiscal problem for the monarchy remained. Despite the
stabilization and widening of the credit market, there was no "financial
revolution" in France. Even though credit was flowing more freely
than ever before, the royal government still had to fund its wars by
loans followed by selective defaults rather than by permanent tax
increases and loans underwritten by a representative body like the
English Parliament.'®^ The major consequence of the French crown's
shift toward voluntary lending, therefore, was high interest rates,
particularly when viewed against comparable Dutch and English loans.
Earlier in the monarchy's fiscal history, interests rates paid to venal
officers had not been high (not more than 4 percent) because, as one
historian observed, the offices carried "costly grants of privilege" in lieu
of monetary compensation. When credit was raised through voluntary
means on the open market, "the monarchy continued to pay high
In the early 1750s, during discussions with the Assembly of the Qergy over paying the
vingtiime, the royal representative d'Ormesson stated, "toutes les dettes contractes pour la
defense et la soutien deI'Etat, Sa Majeste les regardecomme dettes de I'Etat" Cited byGabriel
Lepoint, Uorgpnisation et lapoMque jinanciire du clergl de Prance sous le rigne de Louis
(Paris:
Recueil Sirey, 1923), 221. In a letter by the controller general Laverdy to Miromesnil in 1767,
Laverdy contemplated reducing interest payments on rentes to 2.5%, but decided against it,
citing the principles of "good faith and honor." Mireille Touzery, L'invention de I'impot sur ks
revenus: le tmlle tarifle: 1715-1789 (Paris: Comite pour rhistoire economique, 1994), 215. By
1789 the sentiment could be found at the local level in cahiers, such as that of the nobility of
Albret, which called for the consolidation of the national debt required by the "honor of the
prince and that of Vnace." Archivesparkmentaires, 1:703.
Hoffman, et. al.. Priceless Markets, 93. Unfortunately, their book does not explore the
ramification of these defaults on interest rates.

490

1650-1850

yields."'"® At mid-century, a journal in Brussels estimated that the
French government had to pay about 5 percent, the British 3 percent,
and the Dutch Republic only 2.5 percent for access to long-term credit
The higher French rates were based on a concept of prepaid default,
that is, creditors were assured that they would make a high enough
return on their investment early on to offset the government's partial
repudiation later.'""
A second innovation also increased the cost of French debt
servicing. By the mid-eighteenth century, the English were increasingly
using loans that paid only interest. Although the life of the loan was
perpetual, low interest rates meant that the annual debt servicing
charges were not a great burden to the state. The French, however,
moved in a different direction, toward the use of life annuities, or rentes
viageres. Life annuities paid the purchaser interest until the person, or
persons ("heads") named in the contract died, at which time the loan
was ended. The apparent advantage for the government was that this
kind of loan was self-extinguishing and would not burden the govern
ment indefinitely. The disadvantage, and a great one, was that these
annuities also carried high interest rates, up to ten percent, as a way to
compensate the buyer. As a result, the cost to the French government
was enormous. According to the calculations of Guillaume-Frangois
Mahy de Cormere, an official who worked on tax reform for both
Necker and Calonne, a loan of 60 million at 5 percent reimbursed in
fourteen years cost 85,364,334 livres 'va. interest and principal. The cost
of the same loan in life annuities at 9 percent on two heads lasting sixty
years cost 164,700,000 livres, almost double the amount of the first.""

Riley, Seven Years War, 185.
Riley, Seven Years War, interest rates 208, prepaid de&ult, 184-91. Even in areas where
there was no fear of default, the government paid higher interest rates than necessary. Julian
Swann points out that the Estates of Burgundy, whose credit was impeccable, offered loans
at 5 percent interest plus amortization on behalf of the French monarchy. The Burgundian
Estates demanded that the interest rate remain high, because Burgundy lacked other types of
manufacture. The peasants of Burgundy bore much of the costjof servicing these loans. In
this case, interests rates were part of a culture of patrimonialism that catered to renders. Julian
Swann, Prorinciat Power and Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundj/, 1661-1790
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 189,299-300.
"" Memoire sur lesfinances etsurle cridit (Paris, 1789). Cormere may have exaggerated the cost
to the government by choosing sixty years as the term of the life annuities, a length that
exceeded normal life expectancy. Yet it is also true that the "heads" on Genevan loans were
very carefully screened to exceed life expectancy, so his estimate may be accurate. Cormere
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Although it has been argued that the government was simply inept
in offering such extravagant returns, it seems more likely that the move
to expensive life annuities stemmed from the bad credit rating of the
royal government combined with its desire to woo newinvestors to the
market. Lifetime annuities were available in smaller denominations
than perpetual rentes, carried a higher interest rate, and made sense to
individuals who were single or unconcerned about passing an inheri
tance down to heirs."* Terra/s default of 1770, which wreaked havoc
with French credit, helped to ensure that the lifetime annuity became
the cornerstone of the government's long term credit. Terray sus
pended payments on certain types of royal paper and reduced interest
rates on rentes and tontines without compensation. Although he
realized an immediate and necessary savings of 38 million livres for the
government, he also alienated Paritian rentiers and made it difficult to
obtain further credit from them. After Terray's attempt to issue rentes
perpetuelles at 4% failed miserably, he was forced to resort to selling
Kfetime annuities in Geneva with an effective interest rate of 11 to 12
percent. Although Terray fell, the years until the Revolution were
clouded by his legacy. Even highly respected finance ministers like
Necker were forced to issue expensive annuities as the French
government became more eager to woo investors.*'^
A new twist came for the government's fortunes, or misfortunes,
when Swiss bankers figured out how to turn the French government's

was a government official in charge of creating a plan to unify customs inside France and
abolishthe^a^t&. SeeJohnF. Bosher, TheSingleDutrPryect,AStuifyeftheMoiiementforaFrencb
Customs Union in the EighteenthCtntury, (London; University of London Althone Press, 1964),
103-26.
Riley, Seven Years War, 173, 176. Riley upholds the incompetence thesis. By contrast,
Hoffman, et. al. see the new annuities as the government's attempt to tap a new market.
Priceless Markets, 160-61. It cannot be argued that Necker, who relied on life aimuities to
finance the American War, was incompetent as a banker. On the versatility of the life
annuities foran artisanal group like the Parisian seamstresses,see Crowston, Fabricating Women,
378-79.
For the story ofTerray's search for credit, Luethy, Banqueprotestante,2:470,487. InJanuary
1772, a desperate Terray wrote to Necker, "We beg you to help us.....Time presses and you
are our only hope." Cited in Jean Bouvier, "The Protestant Bankers in France from the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes to the Revolution,"in RagnhildHatton, ed., Louis XIV and
His World(London: Thames and Hudson, 197^, 275. According to David R. Weit,Terray's
default on the tontines taught the urban middle class "that in periods of crisis they were
powerless to defend their interests." 'Tontines, PublicFiiunce, and Revolution in France and
En^nd, \6SS-nS9," Journal of Economic Histo^YlJX (1989): 124.
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life annuities into "a rousing good investment" with great speculative
possibilities. They could do so because the French government did not
correlate interest rates of life annuities to the age, sex, or health of the
designated "head." Since interest was paid until the head, of person
designated on a life annuity contract, died, the longer that person lived,
the more the investor made. In 1771 Genevan bankers began to form
syndicates that bought up French life annuities on groups of thirty
healthy girls under seven years of age who had survived smallpox, the
renowned 'Thirty Genevan Heads." The annual income derived from
the thirty life annuities was pooled, so that even if one or two girls died,
investors could still count on a respectable income. The interest paid
on one head was nine per cent, but higher if lottery options were
added. As a result, an investor without capital could borrow at four or
five per cent using the life annuity as collateral and invest in the French
government at nine to ten per cent. The investor could then use the
profits to liquidate the loan and pocket a nice gain. Between 1777 and
1786 Necker and his successors raised 776,000,000 livers from this kind
of annuity, including 305,000,000 Uvers by Calonne."^
As one historian observers, "by paying excessive returns the state
was behaving like a near-bankrupt merchant."'" Speculators, like the
perennially optimistic Etienne Claviere, consoled themselves with the
idea that the monarchy was acting in good faith and would not sully
French honor by declaring bankruptcy. Indeed, the passionate,
patriotic calls by men like Brissot de Warville to prevent bankruptcy in
order to maintain the honor of the French nation were hardly disinter
ested."^ They stood to lose a great deal if the government defaulted.
Although the French government widened its search for credit
beyond its borders, one thing remained constant: government
connections oiled the system. As credit expanded in Francejso did the
tentacles of court capitalism. The creation of the Discount Bank {caisse
d'escompti) in 1776, along with the various joint-stock companies that it

As told by George V. Taylor, "The Paris Bourse on the Eve of the Revolution ,
AmmcanI1iitoricalBjvini,\o\. 67 (1962):951-77, especially 961-5. OnCalonne's
loans. Marcel Marion, Histoire finandirt de la France depids 1715,6 vols. (Paris: A. Rousseau,
1914), 1:354, 365, 374. See also Luethy,
2:479-81.
Taylor, 'Taris Bourse," 965.
Brissot de Warville, Point de hanqueroute (N.P., 1787).
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helped to generate, provide cases in point. Authorized to issue
banknotes and discount commercial paper at four per cent, the
Discount Bank was the closest thing in France to a state bank. To
enjoy the benefits of this bank, however, one had to be an affiliated
director, who tended to be insiders like members of the General Farms
or bankers with political connections. One operation facilitated easy
profits at the expense of the French government. Genevans drew
drafts on their correspondents in Paris, who them had them discounted
at the Discount Bank at four percent and then invested the funds in the
Royal Treasury at eight to ten per cent. Without any outlay, they gained
the profit resulting from the difference between the two rates."®
The inflation of credit made possible by theDiscount Bank helped
to underwrite the creation of four additional joint-stock companies,
whose shares also became objects of speculation. An illustrative battle
was between two Genevan bankers in exile, Panchaud and Claviere, for
the exclusive royal privilege to establish a life insurance company. In
the end Claviere won the contract, which included a promise to buy the
Parisian properties of the Due de Choiseul so that his family could
meet the demands of his heaviest creditors. Claviere sold shares worth
eight miUion livers to launch the company, but 5.3 million of these
funds were apparendy used to buy government life annuities paying 10
per cent instead. In a report in 1789, there was no evidence of any
premiums received or , policies issued."^ A primary occupation of
speculators was gambling on futures contracts, that is, whether the
price of stock would have risen or fallen in price at a time when a
speculator had agreed to purchase or sell shares. The gains could be
enormous, but so could losses, and the price of stock became enor
mously volatile, subject primarily to the elusive force of public
confidence. This kind of wheeling and dealing that has led to George
Taylor to assert that "the most spectacular operations of old regime

Bigo, Bases historiques, 38,47,170-71; see also Thomas Luckett, "Credit and Commercial
Society in France, 1740-1789," (Ph.D. Dissertation,Princeton University,1992), 193-98. On
the growing symbiotic ties between court capitalists and the Discount Bank after 1781, see
Munro Price, BresemngtheMommigstbe ComUde Vetgetuus, 1771—17S7 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 94-103.
Taylor, "Paris Bourse," 974.
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capitalism were made possible by royal finance and political manipula
tion rather than industrial or maritime enterprise.""®
The movers and doers involved in these high-rolling transactions
constituted a mixture of old and new groups, bourgeois and noble.
Foreigner bankers and traders, especially Swiss bankers who were
exiled after the failure of a democratic revolution in Geneva, formed
the core. Around these foreigners was a small group of French bankers
and nobles, including the slippery hhho^-qgioteur, Talleyrand and the
abbe d'Espagnac, who almost succeeded in cornering the stock issued
for Calonne's newly resurrected East Indies Company. Because the
price of stock largely followed the level of public confidence in any
given project, writers like the comte de Mirabeau and Jacques-Pierre
Brissot were tapped to write sensationalist pamphlets designed to sway
public opinion, and did so quite successfully in the interests of their
patrons"®

^ Toward Political and Financial Bankruptcy:
The State Against Itself ^
In August, 1786, Calonne revealed to the king that the royal govern
ment was facing deficits of enormous proportions. Receipts were 474
million Uvers, expenditures totaled 575 million, leaving a deficit of 101
million.'^ He convinced Louis XVI to call a handpicked Assembly of
Notables to undertake a program of massive reform. The cornerstone
of reform was a new land tax paid in kind (the subvention territoriale) to
fall upon all members of the state, including all of its privileged
members, even the clergy. Calonne's reforms represented the latest
and most strident attack of the monarchy upon privileged groups, many
of which formed part of its own infrastructure, and it is hardly
surprising that these measures were vigorously rejected by the nobles
controlling the Assembly. The failiure of reform during this period.
'Types of Capitalism", 489.
"'Taylor, "Paris Bourse," 953; Luckett, "Credit,"!99; Frederick Nussbaum, 'The Formation
of the New East India Company of Calonne," American Historical Rm«' 38 (April 1933);
475-98. On Brissot's role, see Robert Darnton, "Ideology on the Bourse,"in Michel Vovelle,
ed., L'image de la "RtvobeHon fianfaise, 4 vols. (Paris: Pergamon Press, 1990) 1:124—39.
Marion, Historyfinancihe, 1:392.
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often called the aristocratic "prerevolution," forced the calling of the
Estates General,which made revolution, a seizure of sovereignty by the
Third Estate, possible.
Perhaps the most common interpretation of the prerevolutionary
period has been to see it as the last great attempt of a centralizing
monarchy to dramatically curtail aristocratic privileges that prevented
modernization of the society. Reform faded because the "traditional"
sectors of society, the clergy and nobility, were too powerful for the
monarchy to touch. This article suggests a different interpretation: the
Revolution came about as the patrimonial state faltered from its own
contradictions. Over the centuries the early modern French state had
produced a variety of institutional networks all designed, in rather
haphazard fashion, to mobilize credit for the crown. Because these
networks were critical to the state, while generating hostile and
contradictory interests (new nobles, robe nobles, military nobles,
financiers, court nobles), the state was characterized by bouts, often
severe, of internal institutional conflict. For a variety of reasons, the
mobilization of credit after 1786 began failing in all sectors of the state.
Some reasons represented short-lived crises, for example, economic
problems in the wine and wool industries that affected tax returns.
Nonetheless, deeper structural problems were also at work: the
monarchy had lived for centuries by fighting wars and then repudiating
debt. In 1787 it found it could no longer do so. The credit network of
the patrimonial state had generated such deep vested and conflicting
interests that reform of this state with its outgrowths of privileged
venal offices, tax farming, high-interest public loans, and speculation
was impossible. All the major attempts to rationalize the patrimonial
state and make it more efficient and equitable simultaneously weakened
the underside of this state: its lines of credit secured by privilege. If
reform were to succeed, changes in government in government
structure and state credit practices would have to go hand in hand.
From the time of the mid-century wars, royal reformers had tried
to make inroads against the decentralized quality of financial organiza
tions underpinning the patrimonial state. As John Bosher has shown,
it was becoming common for reformers to argue that public service

For the period as a whole,seeJean Egret, The French Prerevolution, 1787-1788, trans. Welsey
D. Camp. (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1977).
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ought to be more clearly distinguished from private affairs, that
government funds be clearly separated from private monies, and that
officials be assigned to posts without regard to personal status.*^
During the war supporting the American revolution, Necker developed
some of the most aggressive policies to date. He curtailed the
independence of the Farmers General by taking the excise taxes and
stamp duties away from them and placing them under a regie, that is,
direct management by royal agents salaried by the Crown. He also
consolidated the venal tax accounting corps of forty-eight independent
Receivers Generals into a paid administration, or regie, of twelve and
went on to suppress all sorts of offices in the royal household and
Department of the Navy. Finally, he exploded the idea that state
finance was the king's secret, part of royal household affairs, by
publishing the Compte B^ndu, the surprising runaway best seller that
unveiled the condition of royal finances and thus treated the state as a
"public" entity at least marginally accountable to its subjects.^^
Necker's goal was simple, to give the monarchy control over its
own finances, but in the context of the patrimonial state with its deeply
ingrained mixture of public and private affairs, it was also revolution
ary. He could only succeed to the extent that he did because he was
able to keep credit flowing from sources outside the traditional network
of venal officeholders and tax farmers. Those sources (mainly lifetime
annuities), as we have seen, were exceedingly expensive and heavily
dependent on the state of public confidence in the government, hence
the need for the Compte "Rendu. Unsurprisingly, Necker brought the
wrath of tax farmers, receivers, and courtiers down on his head, and
when he was no longer needed to finance the war, he was dismissed.
What his attempted reforms revealed most of all was the resiliency of
longstanding interests wedded to the state. After he fell, his successors,
faced with enormous debts from the most recent war, had no other

Pnncb Finances,125-41.
Bosher, French Finances, 145. Bosher critiques Marcel Marion, •who argued that the
suppression of offices 'was a praiseworthy economy measure, hut did not actually save much
money because the capitalof the offices had to he repaid. See Marion, His/eire finandlre, 1:308.
Bosherargues persuasivelythat Necker's goal was far deeper than mere economy. He wanted
to make finances public, efficient, and accountable. Unfortunately, Bosher does not address
Marion's point, ako valid, of how the capital of these offices would he refunded.
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way to cope than to return to old networks of court capitalism to find
credit for the state.
i
Necker's successors at the post of controller general undid thiich
of his administrative consolidation. Joly deFleury recreated forty-eight
venal offices of Receiver General. His brief tenure was followed by the
attempt of the controller general Lefevre d'Ormesson,^/r, in 1783 to
turn additional sectors of the Farmers General into a re^e interesse. Hie
plan backfired. It stimulated a run by creditors of the Farmers General
for immediate repayment and led the Farmers General to close down
discretionary loans to the monarchy. D'Ormesson fell soon afterward.
Episodes like this led the Minister of War Vergennes to fume that the
Farmers General were "more powerful than the king and his parlemnts" and that the politics of France was "almost at the mercy of the
lease made to this company."'^
Lefevre d'Ormesson's successor, Calonne was put into office by
court nobles to appease the traditional financial drdes. He had married
into one of the most powerful fina ncial families of the period, and was
endorsed by an some of the most influential nobles at court, including
the comte d'Artois, the comte de Vaudireuil, the Polignac and the
Luyne families, as well as Vergennes and the queen herself. He
reestablished the Farmer's General lease to stop the imn on credit, and
created a sizeable number of venal financial offices: two more offices
of Receiver General, twenty offices of payers of rentes for 300,000 livers
each, twenty controllers of rentes iot 80,000 each, and sixty offices of
agent de change at 100,000 each. His belief was that people had more
faith in credit secured by theimmense private fortunes of the Receivers
Generals and tax farmers than by the monarchy itself with its frequent
record of default. He was solicitous of noble patrons and helped out
les grands who were overextended by buying the lands and forests of
such great nobles as the heirs of the due de Choiseul, the prince de
Rohan-Guemenee and the due de liancourt, for hundreds of thou
sands of Uvers. Between 1783 and 1785, Calonne opened three public
loans totaling over 100 million livers, but, unlike Necker, these were

As recaUed by Comte Mollien, MSmtdres d'un Mimstrt du TresorPubEc, 1780-1815 (Paris,
1989),1:87, for the run on the Farmers General,89—93. According toJohn Hardman,in order
to thwart any restructuring of the General Farm, the Faimers General "deliberately en^eered
the collapse of their own notes on the Bourse." French PoEHcs, 1774^1789 (London; Long
man, 1995), ISO.
'
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issued in peacetime, not war, and were not balanced by reforms at
court and suppressions of venal offices, quite the contrary.'^^ As we
have seen, Calonne also helped to increase the size of the Discount
Bank and supported the formation of new joint-stock companies,
which provided such a fertile field for specidation.
Calonne's extravagant fiscal policies soon ran up against another
deeply-entrenched sector of the patrimonial state, the Parlement of
Paris. One of the powers of the Parlement of Paris was to register new
royal loans, which gave them legal standing, thereby reassuring
creditors. A king could always enforce registration of a loan through
& lit de justice, but, because public subscription to a loan was purely
voluntary, that measure would merely frighten creditors and jeopardize
the success of the loan.'^ In 1783 and 1784 the Parlement registered
Calonne's loans after short representations to the king. In 1785,
however, the magistrates in the court began to put up more serious
resistance and registered Calonne's loan only after appending a
resolution that drew attention to the "danger and consequences of
loans too widely propagated."'^^ Louis XVT called the magistrates to
Versailles where he had the offending portion of the registration
erased. There was a second problem, although few people knew about
it. Calonne had over-subscribed a loan after registration, that is,
borrowed more than had been authorized. He was not the first
controller general to do so. One of Calonne's enemies, however, the
baron de Breteuil, minister for the King's Household, knew of this ploy
and in 1786 threatened to give key members of the parlement informa
tion that wovild "deliver such a blow to the finance minister's credit
that he will no longer be able to raise money."'^ Owing to moves by
"'John F. Bosher,The FrenchRevohitioti (New York:Norton, 1988), 97; Bosher, French Finances,
\80-82; Jules Fkmmermont, "Letttes ineditesde Marie-Antoinette: La banquexoute RohanGuemenee," La FevoIuHonfraupuse 34 (1989):140-47; Price, Preserving theMonarcfy,\50~SS.
John Hardman, The French Pevoktion: A Sourcebook (London: Arnold, 1999), 19. On the
importance of parlementary powers of registration see Riley, SevenYean War, 208.
For theparlementary representations seejules Flammermont,ed., Remonlrancesdu Parlement
eieParisauXVinesiicb,3yo\s. (Paris:ImprimerieNationale, 1888-98),3:514—7(loanof 1783);
3:600-3 ^oan of 1784) and 3:640-49 (loan of 1785). In the last case, the Parlement accused
Calonne of appearing to create perpetual rentes when in fact the loan consisted of more
expensive rentes tna^ires. See Price, Preserving the Monarc/ff, 115-33, for an analysis of how
internecine conflictamong Louis XIVs ministers poisoned the crown's workingrelationship
with the Parlement of Paris.
For documents and commentary see Hardman, French PtvoltiHon;A Sourcebook, 21-22.
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other court officials, he never acted on the threat, but it revealed that
the parlement did potentially wield a kind of tnomp card over Calonne.
In any case, Calonne never returned to the parlement to ask for another
loan.
In 1786 half of the revenues of the government were occupied in
servicing the debt, the third direct tax known as the vingtieme was due
to expire, and key members of the parlement of Paris were enemies of
Calonne. Then, in late 1786 and early 1787 a credit famine began.
Provincial merchants blamed it on the Discount Bank, whose policy
seemed to favor the export of specie, and on the enormous wave of
speculation on the Parisian stock market. For what ever reason, credit
dried up, and suddenly bankruptcies and scandals began to rock the
financial community. In 1787 five financiers went bankrupt, including
the spectacularly wealthy Baudard de Sainte-James, venal treasurer
general of the navy, who had invested heavily in mines, the Paris Water
Company, and supplies to the navy.'^® With credit drying up, the third
vin^ieme ended, the parlement against him, and a deficit of 60 trullion
livres, Calonne was forced to innovate. He decided to call an Assembly
of Notables, a body that had not been convoked since 1626, to rubber
stamp a reform package. Central to his program was a new land tax
levied in kind on all groups, privileged or unprivileged, even including
the Church. Other proposed reforms were to suppress internal tariffs,
make the gabelle more uniform and moderate, extend the tobacco
monopoly to all provinces, free the grain trade, and begin discussion of
liquidating the clergy's debt. When the Notables proved unwilling to
swallow this unpleasant dose of fiscal medicine, Calonne tried to whip
up public support. 'Trivileges will be sacrificed!" read one of his
declarations. "Can one doubt thatin the end every other consideration
will yield to the voice of patriotism...to that sentiment of honor so
strong in the Frenchman's breast?"'^
Bosher, French Finances,182-89. According to Henri Legoherd, Let Trlsoners£iniraux dela
Marine (1517-17S8) (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1963), 348-53, Sainte-James hdd a monopoly on
providing supplies for the navy as of 1785, was an administrator of the Discount Bank, and
invested heavily in the government Compagnie Fran^aise deCommerce du Nord. Part of the
reason for his bankruptcy was that the government cancded a contract with the latter
company at the same time as a desperate Calonne ordered administrators of the Discount
Bank to put up 70 million Bms in additional caution money. Sainte-James was left without
liquid resources.
}i^sAxTa.'a, French'RtvoluHon: A Sourcebook,
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As the Assembly of Notables gathered for deliberation, the trading
of "bears" and "bulls" on the stock market became so volatile that
government credit .\ras threatened further. In order to stabilize the
declining price of stock in the Indies company, Calonne advanced
government funds to a financial syndicate, headed by the abbe
d'Espagnac. The abbe, however, used his liberty to try to buy up all
available Indies stock and set up a corner to secure enormous profits.
When the plan was found out, Calonne was forced to use more
government funds to rescue traders caught short. In effect, Calonne
was the victim of the speculators, but his fall was dramatic. Confidence
in the government declined, making credit even more difficult to
obtain, and eventually Calonne fled to England."'
Thus, after coming to the Assembly of Notables with bold
statements of the need for reform, especially the need to end the
harmful fiscal privileges of the nobility, clergy and officeholders that
crippled the state's finances, Calonne nowhere outlined any procedures
for reforming the basis of credit. He had bailed court nobles out of
financial distress, augmented the number of privileged venal financial
officeholders, and promoted, though not necessarily deliberately,
conditions for speculation on the stock market. The last great
spokesman for court capitalism, he himself appeared to be, as one
contemporary noted, "a combination of all the abuses he wanted to
reform.""^ The nobles in the Assembly of Notables were all too happy
to deflect attention away from their own tax privileges and to blame
Calonne for the financial woes of the state. To verify the state of the
deficit, they demanded that the government show them the books.
Meanwhile, the Notables' opposition to the government was further
weakerung public credit'"
Louis XV retreated. He released a statement of iucome and
expenditures and proposed to the Notables a series of loans secured by
a temporary extension of the stamp tax and by a more limited land tax.
To replace Calonne, he had appointed the Intendant of Finance,
Chaumont de la MiUiere, who was regarded as an ally of Calonne;
confidence did not return to the stock market. "The royal bonds

Taylor, "Bourse," 956,970-72.
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decline gradually every day, affecting all other public securities," stated
the Ga^effe de Leyde on 29 April 1787."'^ On 1 May 1787, Lomenie de
Brienne, archbishop of Toulouse and leader of the Notables' opposi
tion to Calonne, was appointed head of the Royal Council of Finances.
Two days later, on May 3, the Notables approved a loan of 84 million
livres 'va. rentes via^eres, which was registered quickly by the parlement of
Paris. No more successful than Calonne at coaxing the Notables to
endorse other reforms,Brienne dismissed them on 25 May 1787. Once
again the royal government faced the defiant parlement of Paris.
The latter registered a number of Brienne's proposals, including
freedom of the grain trade and establishment of provincial assemblies,
but it balked at passing the stamp tax and land tax. Like the Notables,
it demanded to see the books, and then passed a resolution asking for
the convocation of the Estates General. When it became apparent that
the parlement would not back down, Louis XV, on 15 August 1787,
exiled them to Troyes. Rather than breaking the sovereign court,
however, the measure simply fed popular anger. All the force in the
world could not accomplish what the monarchy desperately needed,
namely credit to tide it over. With the parlement in exile, confidence
fell and reserves in the Discount Bank dropped from 45 to 22
trdUions."® A fearful Brissot, associated with speculators like Claviere,
penned Point de banqueroute, which denounced any thought of bank
ruptcy and praised the role of the parhment as the guarantor of royal
loans. The government retreated again. It withdrew the land and
stamp taxes, and asked the parlement to register an extension of the two
vingtiemes. On 20 September 1787, the parlement of Paris returned,
greeted by dances and fireworks.'^®
Once the parlement had returned, Brienne set about planning a
series of loans totalling 420 millions over five years to meet the deficit.
To create a more favorable chance for parlementary registration, in
Novermber, 1787, he announced the convocation of the Estates
General in 1792, hoping that by then the financial situation would be
manageable. He also coupled the registration of the loan with a law
providing civil status for non-Catholics. Significantly, one of the most

Egret, French Prerevolntion, 28.
B^o, Pases tristoriques, 41.
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vocal opponents of the royal administration at this time was the
Jansenist Robert de Saint-Vincent, who had campaigned for the cause
of religious toleration. He and a number of other opposition leaders
believed that parlementary registration of the loan of 1787 should only
occur if the monarchy agreed to call the Estates General in 1789, not
1792.'"
Louis XVI himself showed up for the all-important parlementary
session to register the loan on 19 November 1787, which caused a
certain confusion about procedures. Was it proper for the parlement
to count votes before registration or not? Several magistrates made
speeches pleading with the king to convoke the Estates General by
1789. Without the Estates General, argued Saint-Vincent, current rates
of interest would continue and perpetuate a "scandalous" form of
usury, "dry up the provinces" and feed speculation. At the end of the
lengthy session, when the parlementaires in regular session would have
voted, the Keeper of the Seals simply ordered registration of the loan
pure and simple. Louis XVI stated that his promise to call the Estates
in 1792 was sufficient. The due d'Orleans then stood up and de
nounced the king's act as illegal. Louis XVI rebuked him and replied
that his action was legal "because I will it.""® For all of the parlement's
attempts to argue that the "nation" should consent to loans and taxes,
the true structure of power at the heart of the state stood revealed.
Sovereignty was personal and dynastic, not national. The due d'Or
leans and two counselors in parlement were exiled.
The effect of the king's action on the loan itself has been subject
to different interpretations. Jean Egret argued that the loan filled
immediately, but Marcel Marion stressed that it "languished; confi
dence was destroyed.""' In any case, litde was altered in relations
between the government and parlement. The royal government
continued to follow what the parlement considered a "despotic"
course, and the parlement continued to oppose the passing of new

Egret, FrenchPrerevolution, 107;On Robert Saint-Vincentsee, Charles O'Brien, 'Jansteisme
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taxes without the calling of the Estates General. The government tried
to use force to break the stalemate once again. In May, 1788, the
Keeper of the Seals, Lamoignon, unleashed a coup d'etat against the
whole venal sector of the judiciary. He abolished many of the"useless"
venal offices in the extraordinary judicial courts like the bureaux des
finances, enhanced the powers of courts under the parlements by
cte.^Mngff'ands bailliages, and restrained the constitutional powers of the
parlements at the top by creating a plenary court that alone would have
powers of registering royal edicts. Since many of the extraordinary
judicial courts had been created primarily as a way for the government
to make money from the sale of offices, rationalization of the judicial
system was unquestionably in order. Yet all of these officeholders
owned their offices, and how could a government on the verge of
bankruptcy repay them their capital investment? And registration of
edicts in a plenary court hardly offered the security of a national body
Hke the Estates General. The government faced massive opposition to
the so-called reforms on multiple fronts all over France.
Force did nothing to mobilize credit for the government, which
it desperately needed as the loan of 1787 was insufficient to meet the
enormity of government obligations. Normally, the Receivers General
and Farmers General played the role of banker to the government and
mobilized short-term loans with their anticipations and rescriptions.
In this case, the loans failed to come through. Brienne later reflected
in his memoirs that he was unaware that the treasury was so completely
bare at this moment and did not know whether the failure of the
financiers to come through was a result of "difficult circumstances or
bad faith, or the intrigue in which they felt themselves involved."''" It
is certainly possible that Brienne's reforms had alienated the Farmers
and Receivers General, because he, like Necker, was intent on rooting
out patrimonial practices deeply embedded in the state's institutional
structure.
Between the fall of 1787 and spring of 1788, Brienne suppressed
173 offices in the Queen's household with a total capital investment of

Egret, French Prerevolution, 182. In this memoir, Brienne seemed to blame the personal
financial advisory committee which met weekly at his house for not informing him of the
enormity of the crisis. Bosher paints a different picture: the men advising Brienne were
competent civil servants and successful bankers deliberately chosen from outside the
traditional network of venal financial officeholders. See French Finances, 201-3.
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1,206,600 livtes"' He abolished of high-level venal treasurers for war,
the navy, the royal households, royal buildings, and roads and bridges
and converted the capital invested in these offices into a surety bond
paying interest of five percent. Finally, Brienne promoted a longstand
ing inquiry, begun by Necker, into the possible removal of internal
customs duties and abolition of ^tgahelk. Brienne thus was the last of
a line of reforming ministers interested in making the state a public
entity, instimtionally differentiated from privateinterests. To his credit,
he laid the foundations for a modern treasury run by, paid by, and
accountable to the government itself. Yet he also found himself on the
brink of bankruptcy, vehemently attacked by powerful factions at
court and their financial allies. In Brienne's own words, he was
brought down by "that class of favorites who regarded the public
treasury as an inexhaustible source of funds on which they were
entided to draw."'^^
Brienne's plight reveals once more the predicament of reformers
in the patrimonial state. Policies of rationalization from above
simultaneously altered or called into question the independence and
privileges on which traditional lines of credit to the government, such
as the rescriptions of venal treasurers, had been established. The. gabelle
and internal customs were hated taxes, but they were critical to the
credit of the Farmers General and the royal government who tapped
the farmed revenues through anticipations. Even the Assembly of the
Clergy closed its doors to Brienne. With measures like civil status for
Protestants and talk of taxing the clergy and liquidating its debt, it is not
surprising that in July 1788, the clergy voted a subsidy of 1.8 million
Uvres for the government instead of the requested eight million."'
Reform could not be successful unless a way could be found to
generate regular credit at reasonable rates of interest without reliance
on networks of privilege, status, and personal ownership. France had
survived by modernizing within patrimonial structures. Now the
patrimonial structures themselves were being dismembered, often at
the hands of royal officials themselves, who were trying to make the
financial infrastructure of the state truly public.

Bosher, French Finances, 205.
Cited by Bosher, French Remlntion,107. For Brienne's reforms, French Finances,119-214.
Egret, French Prerembition,nO.
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In the end, the last and most fundamental aspect of patrimonialism, the personal sovereignty of the king, had to be ceded to a public
body, the Estates General. As a number of contemporaries pointed
out, the debt facing France was a national, not a royal one. The king
should not even have the right to decide the fate of this enormous
legacy, as the debt was not his possession.^^ Asked by the royal
government to study the question of the upcoming Estates General,
the barrister P, L. Lacretelle observed that the old forms no longer
seemed relevant. It would be embarrassing to apply them, because
those assemblies "were more feudal than national, whereas today
proprietors and investors, noble or not, have equal interest in public
prosperity, whose base more than ever rests on money and the good
condition of finances.""^ For Lacretelle, the expansion of government
credit legitimated new forms of representation.
It might be asked whether Brienne could not simply have
defaialted, as had Terray two decades earlier, rather than call an Estates
General. It is hard to see what this would have accomplished. Louis
XVI and his ministers were well aware that credit, that is, credit at
reasonable rates of interest, was absolutely essential to the strength of
the monarchy. In April, 1787, Brienne had written a memoir to Louis
XVI stating that if the crown could cut the costs of tax collection and
borrow at better rates of interest, the monarchy would not have to
borrow much money to survive its current crisis. Louis responded: "it
is certain that there is a great and real savings in reducing the interest
rate, but that can only be done when credit is well established and we
have enough money to lay down the law to the bankers \ci^italistes\"^^.
Far from making credit "well established," default would do the
opposite over the long term. After the bankruptcy of 1770, Terray and
his successors had been able to keep France afloat through the
aggressive sale of high-interest annuities to a wider public, including
foreigners. By 1787 this strategy had come to be regarded as part of
the problem facing France. The interest rates had to be high to attract

For example, the vehemently anti-Calonne pamphlet Conferenct entn un ministre d'itat tt m
conseilkr OMparkment sur hs affairs actuelks (n.p.,1787), and ClaviCTe, De la foipubUqut envers ks
crianders de Fitat (London, 1788).
Egret, Vrtnch Prevoludon, 180, citing the Nomelks a la maiti.
journal de I'Assemblee desNotabks de 1787, ed. Pierre Chevallier (Paris: C. Klincksieck,1960),
82.
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investors and the structure of the Discount Bank and annuities had fed
the speodation that plagued France in the 1780s. Bankruptcy might
clear the books temporarily, but then the same cycle would begin again,
possibly on worse terms. Creditors abroad, furthermore, would not
easily open their pocketbooks again if Calonne repudiated the debt:
default might simply close off this path altogether. Borrowing on the
public market to meet current and future crises, therefore, would
require new forms of guarantees.
When public long-term loans were inadequate to supply the
monarchy's needs, the short-term credit of financiers rescued the
monarchy. As we have seen, this sector was also being closed off.
First, the spectacular bankruptcies of the venal accountants in 1787,
which stemmed in part from over-extension and speculation, meant
that public confidence in the receivers' credit was low. As Necker had
stressed, confidence in the resorptions and anticipations was essential to
mobilize this type of credit.*'*^ Second, reformers in the royal govern
ment itself were gradually eradicating the structural underpinnings of
patrimonial credit. Royal reformers like Turgot, Necker and Brienne
were trying to rationalize the structure of taxation from the top down
to bring in more revenues and to reduce costs of collection, all of
which would create greater efficiency and thus generate confidence in
government borrowing. Rationalization from the top, however, would
also affect the nature of short-term credit currendy generated by the
Farmers General and Receivers, whose loans were secxired by their
personal fortunes and status.*'® Owing to the financiers' tenacious grip
at court and the chronic impoverishment of the crown, the royal
government was never able to free itself consistendy from the services
of the patrimonially based financial sector. Thus in 1788 the royal
In his CompU Rindu, Necker observed that"too large an issue [of anticipations^ is risky, since
support for this depends entirelyon public opinion, and the finance minister who understands
the danger is obliged to live in a constant state of anxiety." Cited in Egret, French FrerevoluHon,
55.
In 1783Joly de Fleury argued that the venal offices of Receivers General, suppressed by
Necker, should be revived because the notes issued by their salaried replacements were
stagnating on the Bourse: "This stagnation [of credit] can only be attributed to the public
opinion which did not approve of the suppression of the Receivers General. This opinion is
not without foundations: the twelveadministrators who were substituted for the 48 Receivers
General sign these rescriptions [notes], it is true, but they are not theguarantors of them. The
people who lend their money want to have a rich guarantor behind the rescriptions." Cited
by Bosher,
R'wwax, 175.
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government found itself trying to eliminate the independence and
privileges of tax farmers and receivers and, at the same time, trying to
raise short-term credit from these same men in the customary manner.
It is not surprising that this path to credit became closed off before the
Revolution. Thus, the one avenue left that did seem to hold out the
promise of credit was the Estates General, coupled with the recall of
Necker.^'" France had accomplished a certain degree of fiscal modern
ization within and alongside its patrimonial structures. In the decades
before the Revolution, various institutions associated with thestate had
played a critical role in luring the public into market relations and
teaching them the rules. Royal ministers had made government
securities more liquid, the government had set up a regulated stock
exchange with publicly quoted prices, the parlement had begun
publishing its remonstrances, the Farmers General set up one of the
first French pension systems for its employees, and royal reformers
including the Gotirnay group, the Physiocrats, and the foreign
Protestant banker Necker had all touted the importance of honoring
property rights. It is hardly surprising that eventually the public
followed by demanding that die government play by a consistent set of
rules itself. Default had been written into the structure of patrimonialism, but it was not part of the rules that people were being taught to
expect of modern markets. By 1789, repudiation of debt was a way
out of bankruptcy was perceived as a national embarrassment, a kind
of international disgrace, rather than a solution.The first two acts after
the Third Estate reconstituted itself as the "National Assembly" were
to state that this body guaranteed the "national" debt and that it had
the right to consent to taxation.

Even when the estates general was called, there were calls for this body to repudiate the
debt, hence the need for Necker to allay fears. On arguments justifying repudiation see
Michael Sonenscher, "The Nation's Debt and the Birth of the Modem Republic; The French
Fiscal Deficit and the Politics of the Revolution of 1789," Histoiy ofPol^calTiou^ht, XVIII
(1997): 253-98. In September, 1788, the merchant Dugard wrote, "The nomination of Mr.
Necker to themitiistry of finance has entirely restored confidence and moneycirculates freely
in Paris as in the past Butitwashigh time to find a remedy, for money was worth 10 and 12
percent in Paris, which entirely disrupted business." Cited byLuckett, "Credit and Commercial
Society" (216). On the decline on yields in government assets after the Natiotial Assembly's
declaration that debts were sacred see Eugene N. White, "WasThere a Solution to the Anden
Regime's Financial Dilemma?"_/a»r»a/cf EconomicUistoty 49 (1989), 568.
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Some actions of members of the National Assembly might be
regarded with a touch of cynicism. The speculating bishop Talleyrand
was an eager advocate of nationalizing church properties in order to
avoid state bankruptcy.'®" Overall, however, a deep- hatred of the
inefficiencies and injustices of the old system, combined with a strong
desire to remove the state from the grip of private ownership and
profit was responsible for the destruction of the institutions associated
with court capitalism. During the Revolution, tax farmer's toll booths
were attacked by crowds, venal offices abolished, the army officer
corps opened fully to merit and professionalized, noble tides destroyed,
pensions repudiated, Versailles sacked, many tax farmers guillotined,
and the parlements discredited, never to be replaced by new sovereign
courts. AH the debts of these patrimonial and corporate institutions
were taken over by the new revolutionary state and nationalized.
Bankruptcy was averted for the time, but the cost was so enormous
that it could not be avoided forever, particularly when revolutionary
France went to war once more. Between 1790 and 1797, the govern
ment at first paid off its obligations in rapidly depreciating asdgnats,
then suspended service on the debt, and finally annulled a third of it.
It was, however, the last default; the nineteenth century saw no
repudiations.'®'
Was the Revolution, then, a product of the market?
In a sense it was a product of the failure of the credit markets of court
capitalism and their related institutions. There was too little market,
because the government retained too many powers of arbitrary
command. And there was too much market, in that all sorts of things,
such as public offices, army commissions, and status, had been sold as
forms of property. When the Revolution redefined the place of status
in public life by creating modern citizenship, it simultaneously
redefined the role of markets by stripping them of public powers and
privileges that had guided so much mercantile activity, especially in the
realm of court capitalism. Under the rules of citizenship, public

As noted by Taylor, "Paris Bourse," 956.
James C. Riley, "The Scale and Effects of the Prerevolutionary Financial Crisis," paper
presented at the Social Science History Association,St. Louis, October 1986;Sidney Homer,
A Htsiaty of Interest 'Rates (New Brunswick: Rubers University Press, 1966), M\—2, 219.
Homer notes that long-term interest rates fell to 3 percent by the end of the nineteenth
century, Histoiy of Interest Rates, 219. For the harm that the Revolution inflicted upon the
notarial network of credit of the old regime, see Hoffinan, et. al.. Priceless Markets.
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functions and status could no longer legally be commodified; at the
same time respect for private ownership was strengthened. In the end,
it is not surprising that the fall of court capitalism occurred in tandem
with the fall of so many institutions of the monarchy. The state and
many of its institutions fell together not because they were "feudal,"
but because the royal government had made too many sectors
dependent upon a peculiar form of capitalism whose inefficiencies,
privileges, and private appropriation of state functions were too costly
for the state to bear.

